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ABSTRACT 
 
In a popular article for History Today (2004), Mark Goldie sketches how John Locke 
was portrayed and received in the British and American contexts as an “icon” for liberty 
from the time of his death in 1704 to the present. This thesis builds on his work, offering 
a detailed analysis of the receptions and portrayals of John Locke’s ‘character’ at thirty-
year intervals: 1704, 1734, 1763, and 1794. I begin with a discussion of Samuel 
Johnson’s definition of “character” in his Dictionary (1755-56), and how he uses that 
representation definition to sketch out the lives of Milton and Pope in Lives of the 
English Poets (1780-81). From here, I discuss Locke as an “under-labourer” and the 
religious controversy about his religious that began after he died in 1704. I then discuss 
how Locke was memorialized as a correct reasoner in the grotto constructed by Queen 
Caroline at Richmond Park, and how he was depicted in the poetry contest held in 1734 
to celebrate its completion. Next, I discuss how Locke was portrayed as an English 
reformer in 1764, with the publication of Richard Hurd’s Dialogues on the Uses of 
Foreign Travel. I conclude with a discussion of how, by the end of the eighteenth 
century, Locke’s character was used as a moral exemplar in both moral and political 
literature, including by John Adams, who would become the second president of the 
United States.   
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
In an article in History Today, published in 2004, Mark Goldie outlines the ways that 
John Locke has been received and reinterpreted throughout the eighteenth century and in 
our own time as an “icon of liberty,” being construed as either a hero or a villain 
depending on how one viewed the liberalism he unwittingly came to represent.  
This association of Locke with liberalism in our own time, Goldie points out, is 
based mainly on the belief “that Locke was the inspiration behind Adams, Jefferson, and 
Washington,” but this Locke is a fictitious one, what Goldie calls “an imagined heritage 
‘Locke.” 1 Goldie further comments that it is for this reason that Locke today “is lauded 
in the United States far more than in his own country,” and particularly by those “right-
wing think tanks” that endorse small governments.2  Written in 2004, Goldie’s remarks 
to this effect are worth repeating in whole: 
The Locke Foundation and Locke Institute teach the virtues of free enterprise and 
the evils of big government. LibertyOnline offers the Two Treatises in its virtual 
library, where it is placed in a litany of great texts of freedom from Magna Carta 
to Ronald Reagan’s ‘evil empire’ speech against the Soviet Union. The National 
Rifle Association cites paragraph 137 of the Second Treatise as an authority on 
                                                 
1 Mark Goldie, “John Locke Icon of Liberty,” History Today (October 2004), 31. 
2 Ibid., 31-32. 
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the right to carry arms. The Arizona State Court Building, opened in 1991, has 
inscribed upon it words from paragraph 202: ‘Where law ends, tyranny begins.’3  
Written even before George W. Bush was elected to a second term, Goldie’s observation 
on the appropriation of Locke to advance political causes remains true. 
This is not to say that Locke has been absent from the British context, for as 
Goldie points out, “Locke once had a British icon too.”4 Goldie writes that after Locke 
died in 1704, “he did not become an icon immediately, however, and he was never an 
uncontested one,” noting that the initial emphasis was on his philosophical ideas rather 
than his political ones.5 
For Goldie, Locke’s renown in Britain began when Queen Caroline installed a 
bust of his likeness, along with those of Newton, Wollaston, Clarke, and Boyle, in a 
grotto she constructed at Richmond Park: “The trend was set round 1730 by George II’s 
consort, Caroline of Ansbach, who commissioned a bust of Locke for her hermitage at 
Richmond”6 In the 1750s, Goldie notes that Locke became an icon for moral virtue, 
insofar as  
Locke as cast as a preacher of social duties and family values. Then, after 1760, 
he was seized upon by radical movements which, in the wake of panics provoked 
by the American and French Revolutions, provoked renewed Tory counterattacks 
against him.7    
                                                 
3 Ibid., 32. 
4 Goldie, “John Locke Icon of Liberty,” 32. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 34. 
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Nearly thirty years after this, at the close of the eighteenth century, Goldie notes that 
“For conservatives, Locke had become a dangerous figure, an icon in need of smashing,” 
due to his perceived endorsement and use by those advocating democracy and popular 
rule.8 Goldie’s point in making these different observations is that the “icon” of Locke 
changed not only over time but also in the American and British contexts.  
This thesis builds on Goldie’s work in exploring how the personage of Locke 
was received in the eighteenth century. Specifically, it will focus on how Locke’s 
“character” was portrayed and made use of over time, with “character” being understood 
as both something one would find in a work of fiction, as well as an embodiment of 
moral worth. The thesis will show that both were made use of in the service of different 
ends. 
I will organize my work in five chapters, counting intervals of thirty years, 
beginning with Locke’s death in 1704. The second chapter is devoted to a discussion of 
“character” as distinct from the actual person with whom that character is associated. For 
that, I will discuss Samuel Johnson’s life of Milton and life of Pope, explaining how he 
is careful to separate the character of each from the actual persons they represent. The 
third chapter discusses both how Locke viewed himself during life as an “under-
labourer” and how others received him after death, even questioning his religious 
sincerity in accusing him of being an atheist. The fourth chapter discusses how Locke 
was received as a correct reasoner in 1734, with Queen Caroline’s construction of her 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 35. 
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grotto at Richmond, and how her reasons for his portrayal there may conflict with what 
others thought of his portrayal there. The fifth chapter discusses how Locke was 
received as a reformer in 1764, with Locke being deployed as a fictitious character who 
argued against sending youth abroad for their education, lest they become even more 
ignorant. The fifth and final chapter discusses how Locke was received in 1794 at a 
superficial level, being deployed largely in the service of political causes, including in 
the American context. I end with some thoughts about future projects stemming from 
these discussions.  
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CHAPTER II 
THE ‘CHARACTER’ OF LOCKE 
 
In his Dictionary of the English Language, Samuel Johnson provides eight definitions 
for the word “character.” He lists: “1. A mark; a stamp; a representation. 2. A letter used 
in writing or printing. 3. The hand or manner of writing. 4. A representation of any man 
as to his personal qualities. 5. An account of any thing as good or bad. 6. The person 
with his assemblage of qualities. 7. Personal qualities; particular constitution of the 
mind. 8. Adventitious qualities impressed by a post or office.” 9 Each definition builds 
on the previous. Johnson’s first definition is a generic one. In its most general sense, a 
“character” is a representation, and the kind of representation in question will nuance the 
remaining seven definitions. For instance, a “character” can be a representation in 
writing, since to represent one’s ideas on paper, one must use words, and those words 
are comprised of characters. The word can also represent the writer of such marks, or 
indeed anyone apart from their writings. It can also be nuanced according to the 
particular qualities of the person or thing in question: qualities of moral worth, 
distinguishing qualities as if a character in a play, or qualities of mind or personality. 
Such worth or qualities are, of course, indicated by words—words which are themselves 
characters. 
                                                 
9 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language (1755-56), “Character.” 
6 
The last definition he gives combines these two senses of “character” as both a 
mark of writing and of a person. The word “impressed” recalls the act of writing, in 
which a word is “impressed” on paper as a representation of an idea, just as non-native 
qualities are “impressed” on an officeholder as a representation of the position held. To 
clarify this meaning, Johnson includes an example of this usage by Atterbury: “The chief 
honour of the magistrate consists in maintaining the dignity of his character by suitable 
actions.”10 Our magistrate, therefore, is compelled by his position to acquire and sustain 
the qualities expected of his position ex officio. In other words, his “character” is how he 
represents himself to the public, in harmony which how the public expects to see him. 
Johnson himself alludes to this relationship between written “characters” of 
words and the “characters” of persons those words represent as he wrote in the 
“Advertisement” to his Lives of the English Poets: 
My purpose was only to have allotted to every Poet one Advertisement, like 
those which we find in the French Miscellanies, containing a few dates and a general 
character, but I have been led beyond my intention, I hope, by the honest desire 
of giving useful pleasure. 
Johnson purports to have intended to give only a “general character” of each poet in his 
Lives.11 From his Dictionary, we may take this intended “character” to be a brief 
description of the distinguishing qualities of each poet, and perhaps commentary on the 
10 Ibid. 
11 Johnson, Lives of the English Poets, vol. 1 (Dublin, 1780), “Advertisement.” 
 7 
 
moral qualities of each. Because Johnson refers to such entries as “advertisements” for 
each poet, he implies an intended brevity in each consistent with a “character” as a sign, 
mark, or representation. 
 The “character” of each poet came to be through a combination of the poet’s own 
words, those of his contemporaries, and the analysis provided by earlier biographers and, 
of course, Johnson himself. In the “Advertisement” to the Lives, Johnson acknowledges 
that he went beyond these brief representations, presumably through the inclusion of 
much more than “a few dates” and elaboration. The result is a distinction in each entry 
between the life or biography of the poet and the character of that poet. The character 
attributed to each poet is not the same as the actual biography, since the latter was itself 
formed through the observations of writing from the poet himself, his contemporaries, 
and later commentators. Johnson’s entries on Milton and Pope provide good examples 
for understanding this distinction.  
 Johnson begins his “Life of Milton” by acknowledging the vast biographical 
work that has been done with respect to Milton. He writes: 
 The life of Milton has been already written in so many forms, with such minute 
enquiry,  
that I might perhaps more properly have contented myself with the addition of a 
few notes to Mr. Fenton’s elegant Abridgement, but that a new narrative was 
thought necessary to the uniformity of this edition.12 
                                                 
12 Johnson, “Milton,” in The Lives of the English Poets, Vol. 1 (1780), 137. 
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The “uniformity” of which Johnson speaks is his elaborated “advertisements” is meant 
to convey the character of each poet, and that of Milton is no exception. Johnson 
suggests that the character of Milton was initially revealed by the author himself in his 
writings: 
It appears, in all his writings, that he has the usual concomitant of great abilities, 
a lofty and steady confidence in himself, perhaps not without some contempt of 
others; for scarcely any man ever wrote so much and praised so few. Of his 
praise he was very frugal; as he set its value high, and considered his mention of 
a name as a security against the waste of time, and a certain preservative from 
oblivion.13 
From Milton’s writings, Johnson finds evidence of the poet’s self-confidence, but also a 
disdain for others. Consistent with this self-confidence, Johnson tells us that it was 
Milton’s practice to refrain from mentioning others in his work, lest he memorialize the 
undeserved. This, we see, is an instance of Milton’s conscious fashioning of character, of 
not only himself but others as well. This is a theme to which Johnson repeatedly returns. 
 Even early in his life, Johnson tells us that Milton engaged in this practice. A 
mere sixteen-years old, Milton evidently engaged in what me might call “forensic” self-
fashioning, re-attributing dates to earlier work, to give the appearance of emergent 
genius. As Johnson relates: 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 142-143. 
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 He was at this time eminently skilled in the Latin tongue; and he himself, by 
annexing  
the dates to his first compositions, a boast which the learned Politian had given 
him as, seems to commend the earliness of his own proficiency to the notice of 
posterity.14 
Such was Milton’s ambition at crafting his character, but his attempt did not escape the 
notice of Johnson who observes: 
But the products of his vernal fertility have been surpassed by many, and 
particularly by his contemporary Cowley. Of the powers of the mind it is difficult 
to form an estimate: many have excelled Milton in their first essays, who never 
rose to the words like Paradise Lost.15 
Milton’s efforts could not erase the realty that the work of other authors, including his 
contemporaries, surpassed his own at the time. At the same time, Johnson notes that 
those other authors, although writing superior work at a younger age, nevertheless failed 
to surpass Paradise Lost.  
In the midst of the Act of Oblivion, Milton is said to have taken refuge in 
multiple residences to evade retaliation from the restoration government for his part in 
Cromwell’s administration, as well as his inflammatory political tracts. Johnson finds the 
scrupulosity of Milton’s biographers in recording the places he resided to be noteworthy: 
                                                 
14 Ibid., 139. 
15 Ibid. 
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I cannot but remark a kind of respect, perhaps unconsciously, paid to this great 
man by his biographers: every house in which he resided is historically 
mentioned, as if it were an injury to neglect naming any place that he honoured 
by his presence.16   
Evidently, those earlier writers of the life of Milton believed his person to be so 
important that their scrupulosity in recording his movements was reminiscent of how 
one would record those of a saint. Nevertheless, this claim of renown by later 
biographers can be called into question by the circumstances of the Act of Oblivion 
itself. 
 Johnson relates that the Act of Oblivion pardoned everyone, “except those whom 
the parliament should except, and the parliament doomed none to capital punishment but 
the wretches who had immediately cop-operated in the murder of the king.”17  Milton, of 
course, had no direct involvement in the regicide and so was spared under this condition, 
since as Johnson notes: “he had only justified what they had done.”18 
 This exception was not to last long, for Johnson relates that even justification of 
the regicide provided enough reason for prosecution: 
This justification was indeed sufficiently offensive; and (June 16) an order was 
issued to seize Milton’s Defense, and Godwin’s Obstructors of Justice, and burn 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 171. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
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them by the common hangman. The attorney-general was ordered to prosecute 
the authors; but Milton was not seized, nor perhaps very diligently pursued.19 
Consequently, Godwin was seized and executed, but Milton was not. Here Johnson finds 
yet another occasion to note the fashioning of character—this time on the part of 
biographers.  
 Evidently, Milton’s biographers debated the reason for his evasion of capture and 
execution. At least one biographer attributed his evasion to his being unnoticed by his 
contemporaries: 
Of this tenderness shewn to Milton, the curiosity of mankind has not forborn to 
enquire the reason. Burnet thinks he was forgotten; but this is another instance 
which may confirm Dalrymple’s observation, who says, “that whenever Burnet’s 
narrations are examined, he appears to be mistaken.”20 
Johnson briefly considers the possibility that Milton was forgotten, but subsequently 
dismisses it, citing the lack of credibility of the biographer, as noted by another 
commentator. Milton, moreover—far from unnoticed—was rather the target of pursuit 
and prosecution, as Johnson declares: “Forgotten he was not; for his prosecution was 
ordered; it must be therefore by design that he was included in the general oblivion.”21 
Considering an alternative explanation, Johnson tells of an account which was allegedly 
circulated amongst other commentators on Milton:  
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 172. 
21 Ibid. 
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A very particular story of his escape is told by Richardson in his Memoirs, which 
he received from Pope, as delivered by Betterton, who might have heard it from 
Davenant. In the war between the king and parliament, Davenant was made 
prisoner, and condemned to die; but was spared at the request of Milton. When 
the turn of success brought Milton into the like danger, Davenant repaid the 
benefit by appearing in his favour.22  
Despite the appearance of hearsay, Johnson considers this story worthy of consideration: 
Milton was spared at the request of Davenant, who had previously been spared by 
Milton himself. While speaking to the character of each author, the account nevertheless 
fails to pass the scrutiny of its alleged transmission history:  
Here is a reciprocation of generosity and gratitude so pleasing, that the tale 
makes its own way to credit. But if help were wanted, I know not where to find 
it. The danger of Davenant is certain from his own relation; but of his escape 
there is no account. Betterton’s narration can be traced no higher; it is not known 
that he had it from Davenant.23  
The provenance of the story in doubt, Johnson speculates its appeal may stem from the 
“generosity and gratitude” displayed by both men. And while “We are told that the 
benefit exchanged was life for life,” Johnson notes that “it seems not certain that 
Milton’s life ever was in danger.”24 Given the dubiousness of the historical accuracy and 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 172-173. 
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logical consistency of the account, Johnson suggests that we are perhaps left only with a 
testimony of Milton’s character: “Something may be reasonably ascribed of his abilities, 
and compassion for his distresses, which made it fit to forgive his malice for his 
learning. He was now poor and an illustrious enemy, depressed by fortune and disarmed 
by nature?”25 Whatever the true reason for Milton’s pardon, his destitute and disabled 
condition made him the object of pity. In the “Life of Milton,” Johnson’s leaves us with 
a character of Milton that, through later biography and commentary, came to be very 
different from the actual life of the poet. 
 Johnson likewise produced an “advertisement” for Pope. As with Milton, 
Johnson mentioned Pope’s early development, including the books he read. Among 
them, Johnson tells us, Pope 
translated Tully on old Age; and that, besides his books of poetry and criticism, 
he read Temple’s Essays and Locke on human Understanding. His reading, 
though his favourite authors are not known, appears to have been sufficiently 
extensive and multifarious; for his early pieces shew, with sufficient evidence, 
his knowledge of book.26 
Pope, however, was not content with simply reading the greats; he desired to be one 
himself, and poetry in particular. It was at age fifteen that Johnson tells us Pope began to 
regard himself as a genius: 
                                                 
25 Ibid. 173. 
26 Samuel Johnson, “Pope” in The Lives of the English Poets, Vol. 2, 274. 
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He then returned to Binfield, and delighted himself with his own poetry. He trued 
all styles, and many subjects. He wrote a comedy, a tragedy, an epick poem, and 
panegyricks on all the Princes of Europe; and, as he confesses, thought himself 
the greatest genius that ever was.27 
Again, this is an instance of an author’s self-fashioning of character. Pope studied the 
great authors of the past, wrote his own poetry, and considered himself not only among 
them, but the greatest among them. Johnson, in turn, comments on this regard Pope had 
for himself, but (unlike Milton) Johnson seems to agree, writing: “Self-confidence is the 
first requisite to great undertakings; he, indeed, who forms his opinion of himself in 
solitude, without knowing the powers of other men, is very liable to errour; but it was 
the felicity of Pope to rate himself at his real value.”28 For Johnson, Pope was like 
Milton insofar as he exuded a high degree of self-confidence, which Johnson notes is 
prerequisite to producing great work. Johnson suggests that unlike Milton, Pope’s work 
was indeed as good as the author himself assessed it to be.  
 Pope was not without his quirks, however. In a particularly salient anecdote, 
Johnson tells of Pope’s construction of a “grotto” within his garden at his residence at 
Twickenham: 
 Here he planted the vines and the quincunx which his verses mention; and being  
under the necessity of making a subterraneous passage to a garden on the other 
side of the road, he adorned it with fossile bodies, and dignified it with the title of 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 273. 
28 Ibid., 273. 
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a grotto; a place of silence and retreat, from which he endeavoured to persuade 
his friends and himself that cares and passions could be excluded.29 
According to Johnson, Pope constructed his “grotto” out of necessity in order to link the 
two sides of his property divided by a road. Evidently, Johnson tells us, Pope tried to 
cast this “subterraneous passage” as a meditative retreat with the “dignified” name of a 
“grotto.” To Johnson, however, Pope’s recasting of this passage also speaks to the 
psychology of the author in dealing with personal defects. 
 Johnson continues to relate that at the time, possession of a grotto was perceived 
as a frivolous object of concern for English gentleman, who could occupy his time with 
other matters; moreover, Johnson notes that recasting the tunnel as a “grotto” was 
completely unnecessary on Pope’s part, as it would have been sufficient to simply leave 
it as a means of transit. Pope’s motivation for doing so, however, can be attributed to his 
character, as Johnson comments: 
A grotto is not often the wish or pleasure of an Englishman, who has more 
frequent need to solicit than exclude the sun; but Pope’s excavation was requisite 
as an entrance to his garden, and, was some men try to be proud of their defects, 
he extracted an ornament from an inconvenience, and vanity produced a grotto to 
where necessity enforced a passage.30 
Although the public may view the grotto as a trivial occupation of Pope’s, unbefitting his 
stature as one of the greats of English poetry, Johnson suggests it was actually yet 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 323. 
30 Ibid., 324. 
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another instance of Pope’s ingenuity. The grotto represented Pope’s attempt to “try to be 
proud” of his defects. While the public would expect someone like Pope to cover up his 
defects, or at the very least ignore them, Pope instead chose to defy public wisdom and 
exacerbate them:  
It may be frequently remarked of the studious and speculative, that they are 
proud of their trifles, and that their amusements seem frivolous and childish; 
whether it be that men conscious of great reputation think themselves above the 
reach of censure, and safe in the admission of negligent indulgences, or that 
mankind expect from elevated genius an uniformity of greatness, and watch its 
degration with malicious wonder; like him who having followed with his eye an 
eagle into the clouds, should lament that she ever descended to a perch.31 
As Johnson explains, at least two possibilities exist for why someone of Pope’s caliber 
would seek to pronounce his defects. One possibility is that the author, already having 
proven himself superior to ordinary people, feels privileged to dally in mundane things, 
which would otherwise be out of character. The other possibility is that the people, used 
to seeing their celebrities aloof, find entertainment in their occasional failings. Whatever 
the case, Johnson makes it clear that Pope’s concern for public acclaim was an enduring 
aspect of his character. 
 Johnson remarks that “Pope may be said to write always with his reputation in 
his head.”32 The account Johnson provides of the Pope’s Essay on Man is a good 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 324. 
32 Ibid., 347. 
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example of this. This text of Pope’s is comprised of a single “epistle”—a text which 
Johnson notes the author “persuaded himself to think a system of Ethicks.’33 When the 
Essay on Man was published, however, it was done so with neither Pope’s name, nor the 
person to whom he dedicated the work. The effect of this, Johnson notes, was that the 
Essay on Man became yet another tool for Pope’s self-fashioning, remarking: “Those 
who like only when they like the author, and who are under the dominion of a name, 
condemned it; and those admired it who are willing to scatter praise at random, which 
while it is unappropriated excites no envy.”34 In other words, publishing the Essay on 
Man anonymously evoked either the condemnation of critics who never praise works 
unless they highly regard the author, or the sincere praise of critics whose opinion would 
not attract jealousy of rival authors, since their praise was directed at no one in 
particular. 
 According to Johnson, some of Pope’s acquaintances knew he was the author and 
leveraged this environment to his advantage: “Those friends of Pope, that were trusted 
with the secret, went about lavishing honours on the new-born poet, and hinting that 
Pope was never so much in danger from any former rival.”35 Pope’s friends, of course, 
were conferring their praises on the author of the Essay on Man, whilst his identity was 
still unknown to the public. This fostered the attitude that whoever the author was, must 
                                                 
33 Ibid., 347.  
34 Ibid., 348. 
35 Ibid., 348. 
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be great indeed. Evidently, Pope himself also had a hand in this fashioning. Johnson tells 
us that:  
To those authors whom he had personally offended, and to those who opinion the 
world considered as decisive, and whom he suspected of envy or malevolence, he 
sent his essay as a present before publication, that they might defeat their own 
enmity by praises, which they could not afterwards decently retract.36 
By soliciting their praise of malevolent critics before revealing his identity as the author, 
Pope managed to put them into an impossible situation of simultaneously harboring 
prejudice against his person privately, while publically praising the work. Because they 
would be perceived as insincere in any retraction, their praises would stand. 
 The reality of the reception of the Essay on Man was less grandiose than perhaps 
either Pope or his friends anticipated, although it was certainly a respectable one 
nonetheless. Pope had purported his work to express a “System of Ethicks” or a “System 
of Morality,” but readers were not so sure.37 Johnson explains: “this design was not 
discovered in the new poem, which had a form and a title with which its readers were 
unacquainted. Its reception was not uniform; some thought it a very imperfect piece, 
though not without good lines.”38 The Essay on Man, in other words, was perceived as 
an unusual form for the purported subject matter: it was neither an “essay” nor was it 
about morality. Johnson’s own analysis corroborates this sentiment, as he remarks that  
                                                 
36 Ibid., 348. 
37 Ibid., 347, 348. 
38 Ibid. 348-349. 
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the Essay abounded in splendid amplifications and sparkling sentences, which 
were read and admired, with no great attention to their ultimate purpose; its 
flowers caught the eye, which did not see what the gay foliage concealed, and for 
a time flourished in the sunshine of universal approbation. So little was any evil 
tendency discovered, that, as innocence is unsuspicious, many read it for a 
manual of piety.39 
While Pope may have thought he was writing an “essay” on ethics or morality, his 
readership perceived the Essay on Man as neither; rather, they perceived it as a poem 
about piety. This is an important anecdote included by Johnson, because it shows how 
even the author’s self-fashioning can fail either because of a miscalculation of how one’s 
work will be received by the others.  
 Lastly, Johnson tells an anecdote concerning how Pope’s character was directly 
saved by one of his former enemies. Johnson tells a story of two men, Crousaz and 
Warburton, engaged in a personal spat that directly affected Pope’s reputation. 
“Crousaz,” Johnson relates, “was a professor of Switzerland, eminent for his treatise of 
Logick,” and “He was accustomed to argument and disquisition, and perhaps was grown 
too desirous of detecting faults; but his intentions were always right, his opinions were 
solid, and his religion pure.”40 Crousaz, then, was an individual evidently prone to 
argument and finding faults, while nevertheless being of righteous character.  
                                                 
39 Ibid., 350-351. 
40 Ibid., 351. 
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 By contrast, Johnson tells us that Warburton “was a man of vigorous faculties, a 
mind fervid and vehement, supplied by incessant and unlimited enquiry, with wonderful 
extent and variety of knowledge, which yet had not oppressed his imagination, nor 
clouded his perspicacity.”41 Warburton’s intellectual skills were also the source of his 
abrasive character, which Johnson tells us was marked by “an haughty confidence, 
which he disdained to conceal or mollify.”42 It was this haughtiness that also caused a 
high degree of vigilance against criticism, for “his impatience of opposition disposed 
him to treat his adversaries with such contemptuous superiority as made his readers 
commonly his enemies, and excited against him the wishes of some who favoured his 
cause.”43 The wantonness of Crousaz towards exploiting weaknesses in favor of religion, 
and tendency of Warburton to respond in force to criticism set the scene for a dispute 
over Pope. 
 Evidently, Crousaz did not see the Essay on Man as a mere poem about piety, as 
did everyone else; rather, he saw it as spreading religious heterodoxy, “favouring 
fatality, or rejecting revelation.”44 Regarding Warburton, Johnson relates that a letter 
surfaced revealing his true feelings about Pope, in relation to other poets, specifically: 
“Milton borrowed by affectation, Dryden by Idleness, and Pope by necessity.”45 
Warburton’s assessment was that while Milton borrowed material for his work out of 
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vanity and Dryden from laziness, Pope borrowed because he had no other choice. In 
other words, in the eyes of Warburton, Pope was not even a good poet. 
 It was Warburton, however, who was responsible for vindicating Pope from the 
accusation of Crousaz. Johnson relates that “whatever his motive,” Warburton “from 
month to month continued a vindication of the Essay of Ma, in the literary journal of that 
time, called the Republick of Letters.”46 Moreover, with the benefit of retrospect, 
Johnson himself suggests that Crousaz’s objections were ultimately ungrounded because 
Pope’s only mention of his religion was in Kyrl, the Man of Ross. In Johnson’s 
assessment, “This is the only piece in which the author has given a hint of his religion, 
by ridiculing the ceremony of burning the pope, and by mentioning with some 
indignation of the inscription on the Monument.”47 Thus, we that the conception of 
Pope’s religious beliefs was formed by an interplay between what he actually wrote, 
how his contemporaries perceived what he wrote, and how later biographers such as 
Johnson analyzed everything in retrospect. 
 Lastly, it is worth telling yet another anecdote of Pope that conveys his self-
fashioning. Johnson remarks that Pope enjoyed a good reputation during his lifetime, 
largely avoiding any trouble due to any personal wrongdoing or prejudice: “Pope lived at 
this time among the great, with that reception and respect to which his works entitled 
him, and which he had not impaired by any private misconduct or factious partiality.”48 
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As we have seen, Pope’s efforts to avoid personal altercation did not prevent it from 
being precipitated by others. Johnson tells is that “It was said, that, when the Court was 
at Richmond, Queen Caroline had declared her intention to visit him.”49 Admitting this 
to be “only a careless effusion,” Johnson relates that “the report of such notice, however, 
was soon in many mouths.”50 Apparently attempting to evade any personal 
embarrassment to himself if such an offer were never made, Pope left his home, as 
Johnson continues: “Pope, pretending to decline what was not yet offered, left his house 
for a time, not, I suppose, for any other reason than lest he should be thought to stay at 
home in expectation of an honour which would not be conferred.”51 Even though he 
made this effort to avoid any negative publicity, Pope was unable to evade the notice of 
Swift, who Johnson tells us “represents him as refusing the visits of a Queen.”52 Pope 
was therefore “angry at Swift” for misrepresenting the situation, since “he knew that 
what had never offered, had never been refused.”53   
 Johnson’s portrayal of the lives of Milton and Pope serve as guides for thinking 
about the life of Locke. As a celebrated intellectual, Locke too has invited the same kind 
of reception and commentary, which may differ from the actual man. Our interest here, 
of course, is his character and how it was received over time. Therefore, it is appropriate 
to begin at the death of the actual man, before discussing the ways the character of the 
man was received. 
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CHAPTER III 
LOCKE AS UNDER-LABOURER, 1704-1705 
 
John Locke died on October, 28 1704 and the epitaph on his tombstone at Christ Church 
Cathedral at Oxford fittingly quips: “I know there is truth opposite to falsehood, that it 
may be found if people will, and is worth the seeking.” Composed by Locke himself in a 
letter to William Molyneaux, such words would be fitting for the memory of any 
philosopher. Immediately following them, however, in the same letter to Molyneaux, 
Locke declares that with regard to this truth, 
I am no more troubled and disturbed with all the dust that is raised against it, than 
I should be to see from the top of an high steeple, where I had clear air and sun-
shine, a company of great boys or little boys (for it is all one) throw up dust in 
the air, which reached not me, but fell down in their own eyes.54 
Those who protest the truth blind only themselves; it is the philosopher who sees above 
the dust that falls and settles. This sentiment, no doubt revelatory of Locke’s wit, is also 
suggestive of his self-ascribed role as an “under-labourer,” who not only cleared the dust 
raised against the truth, but also led people to the clarity of truth.  
In the Essay’s “Epistle to the Reader,” Locke compares himself to an “under-
labourer” tasking himself with “clearing the Ground a little, and removing some of the 
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Rubbish that lies in the way to Knowledge.”55 Specifically, this refuse that must be 
cleared is, in Locke’s eyes, the “frivolous use of uncouth, affected, or unintelligible 
Terms, introduced into the Sciences.”56 The “rubbish” or gibberish to be cleared, in 
short, is the inappropriate use of words relative to the ideas they are intended to 
reference, whether those words are too crude (“uncouth”) for complex ideas, too 
sophisticated (“affected”) for less complex ideas, or altogether nonsensical 
(“unintelligible”) for any ideas at all. As an “under-labourer,” Locke takes it upon 
himself to correct these mismatches between words and ideas, which once cleared will 
open “the way to knowledge,” as he further anticipates in the Epistle.57 
Commentators have suggested these remarks to mean that Locke saw himself as 
undertaking a merely negative project in the Essay. One commentator on Lock’s 
religion, for example, claims that “he intended the Essay to fulfill this initial concern of 
laying a basis in the extent and limits of human understanding for morality and revealed 
religion.”58 Another commentator on Locke’s relation to philosophy of law notes that 
“whilst their task is to clear the rubbish, it is for the master-builder rather than for the 
under-labourer to decide what counts as ‘rubbish’ and as ‘clearing the ground.’”59 Yet 
another commentator merely classifies the remark as “a classic piece of 
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understatement.”60 Commenting on Locke’s epistemology, still another commentator 
observes that “he also intends his epistemology to contribute to scientific knowledge of 
nature” besides morality and the revealed religion.61 Lastly, finding a place for Locke in 
a discussion of management, another commentator notes that “It is because of Locke that 
philosophy, in relation to scientific questions, is sometimes said to play one of two broad 
roles. The first role, in keeping with the traditions of empiricism, is as an under-labourer 
for science” and “The second role that philosophy can play in relation to scientific 
questions is to support critique.”62 Whatever the context, Locke’s words have been 
understood to indicate a negative philosophical project, when in reality his project was 
much different 
 Locke, however, was not the first to use the term “under-labourer:” that 
distinction belongs to Bishop Jeremy Taylor, who in 1667, used the term in a sermon 
with reference to the role of the religious minister.63 Taylor was a bishop in the Church 
of Ireland who sided with the royalists during the Civil Wars.64 According to the 
Harrison-Laslett catalogue of Locke’s personal library, Locke indeed possessed a work 
of Taylor’s titled Symbolon theologikon (1657), suggesting that Locke was aware of 
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him.65 While Taylor does not utilize the term “under-labourer” at all in this particular 
work, he does discuss ideas similar to those he captures by the term in his later sermons, 
regarding the role of the clergy. In a chapter on “An Apology of Liturgy,” he utilizes the 
term “under-servant” to indicate those who do the work assigned to them by the “general 
stewards” of Christian society:  
The very Occonomy of Christs Family requires that the dispensations of be made 
according to every mans capacity. The general stewards are to divide to every 
man his portion of worke, and to give them their food in due season, and the 
under-servants are to doe that work is appointed them.66  
Likewise, in another chapter titled “Episcopacy Asserted,” he continues to discuss 
laboring, claiming that “All Ministers of H. Church did not preach, at least not 
frequently” because “labouring in the word does not signifie only making Homilies or 
exhortations to the people, but whether it be by word, or writing, or travelling from place 
to place, still, the greater the sedulity of the person is, the difficulty of the labour, the 
greater increment of honour is to be given him.”67 Both points regarding the auxiliary 
nature of labor and its diversity of function find their way into his 1667 work under the 
name “under-labouring.” 
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There, in Dekas emboilmaios, in a sermon tilted “The Ministers Duty in Life and 
Doctrine,” Taylor remarks that the minister’s role is to be a mediator between the people 
and God. Directing his remarks to fellow clergy, Taylor exhorts: “you are the Ministers 
of Christ’s Priesthood, Under-labourers in the great Work of Mediation and Intercession, 
Medii inter Deum & Populum; you are for the People towards God, and convey Answers 
and Messages from God to the People.”68 The ministerial “under-labourer” is someone 
who intervenes between God and the people: that is, someone through whom God and 
the people communicate with each other. Taylor then lists the qualities expected in the 
character of such a ministerial “under-labourer,” which are remarkably similar to what 
early commentators have noted about Locke’s own character and interactions with the 
people. 
 Taylor notes that the duty of the under-laborer encompasses both “Holiness of 
Life” and “Integrity of Doctrine,” and he outlines what this requires. Remarking first 
upon “Holiness of Life,” Taylor advises his clergy that “For your Life and Conversation, 
it ought not only to be good, not only to be holy, but to be so up to the degrees of an 
excellent example; Ye must be a pattern.”69 Indeed, Taylor insists that the under-laborers 
are to be exemplars in all aspects of their lives, both in private and when interacting with 
the people. This means that they are to exemplify action, rather than discussion of 
superfluous concepts. Taylor instructs: 
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Ye must be patterns, not only of Knowledge and Wisdom, not of contemplation 
and skill in Mysteries, not of unprofitable Notions, and ineffective Wit and 
Eloquence; but of something by which mankind shall be better; of something that 
shall contribute to the felicity and comfort of the world; a pattern of good 
works.70  
For Taylor, the under-laborer is to be an exemplar in both intellect and action, but even 
the intellect is to have a practical aim. In this regard, he advises that in matters of the 
intellect, under-laborers are neither to dwell on “Mysteries,” nor “unprofitable Notions,” 
nor “ineffective Wit and Eloquence;” rather, in their intellectual pursuits, they are 
instead to contemplate reality, profitable ideas, and effective ways of presenting those 
ideas. As it turns out, Locke also accepted this intellectual discipline for himself. 
 Two of Locke’s earliest biographers, Jean Le Clerc (1657-1736) and Pierre Coste 
(1668-1747), offer accounts of his life that depict the character of a man who could 
easily meet Taylor’s rigorous expectations for an “under-labourer.” Le Clerc and Coste 
were not only contemporaries of Locke’s, but also men who interacted with him during 
his life. Le Clerc and Locke were purportedly great admirers of each other—to the extent 
that Locke, along with Joseph Addison, attempted to help him secure a position in the 
court of Queen Anne.71 Le Clerc, a philosopher in his own right, reciprocated such 
admiration by dedicating his Logica (1692) to both Locke and Robert Boyle.72 Locke’s 
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relationship with Coste, however, could be characterized less as mutual admiration and 
more by mutual respect. 
 Unlike Le Clerc, Coste was a Cartesian—a persuasion that colored his 
relationship with Locke throughout his life. Coste translated many of Locke’s works into 
French, including the first part of The Reasonableness of Christianity (published in 
1696), the Essay Concerning Human Understanding (published in 1700), and the second 
part of The Reasonableness of Christianity (published in 1703). Because of Coste’s 
repute as a scholar, Locke recommended him to be the tutor to the daughter of Francis 
Masham and Damaris Cudworth, and granddaughter of the philosopher Ralph Cudworth, 
Francis Masham. Coste also stayed with one of Locke’s pupil’s, Anthony Ashley 
Cooper, 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, from 1709-1710. Despite the apparent mutual respect 
between the two men, their disagreement in matters of philosophy loomed over their 
relationship, caucusing Coste to not translate some of Locke’s works, including the Two 
Treatises on Government.73 Despite their different relationships with Locke, Le Clerc 
and Coste alike offer anecdotes indicative of man engaged in “under-labouring”—a man 
who dwelt neither on “Mysteries,” nor “unprofitable Notions,” nor “ineffective Wit and 
Eloquence.” They portray, rather, someone engaged in intellectual pursuits, the 
contemplation of reality, profitable ideas, and effective ways of presenting those ideas. 
 With respect to avoiding “contemplation and skill in Mysteries,” Le Clerc wrote 
that Locke complained “that he lost a great deal of Time, when he first applied himself 
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to Study, because the only Philosophy then known at Oxford was the Peripatetick, 
perplex’d with obscure Terms and stuff’d with useless Questions.”74 Aristotelian 
(“Peripatetick”) philosophy, in Locke’s eyes, occupied those who were detached from 
the concerns of the world, and their discussions having no real weight on its 
improvement. Locke’s distain for such practitioners was duly noted by Coste, who wrote 
that “Mr. Locke was so far from assuming those airs of Gravity, by which some folks, as 
well as learned as unlearned, love to distinguish themselves from the rest of the world; 
that on the contrary, he looked upon them, as an infallible mark of impertinence.”75 
Among such intellectuals who Locke regarded as “impertinent” were those who engaged 
in public debate, a peculiar dislike of Locke’s noted by both Le Clerc and Coste.  
Le Clerc notes that,” Locke “was ever adverse to these, and always look’d upon 
them as no better than wrangling, and that they served only for a vain Ostentation of a 
Man’s Parts, and not in the least for the discovery of Truth, and advancement of 
Knowledge.”76 Coste likewise notes that Locke, “Cared yet less for those professed 
Disputants, who being wholly taken up with the desire of coming off with victory, 
fortify themselves behind the ambiguity of a word, to give their adversaries more 
trouble.”77 Evidently, Locke disliked public debate because of its association with 
Aristotelianism and scholasticism. By prioritizing victory over an opponent through the 
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inappropriate use of words, the disputants invariably perpetuated mysteries rather than 
the truth, that is: the mismatch of words and ideas, rather than their proper ordering. 
Such distaste for debate is consistent with the role of an under-laborer, as Taylor 
defined it, because an under-laborer is to avoid “unprofitable notions,” which Locke saw 
as permeating debates. Le Clerc and Coste are also explicit in establishing Locke’s 
penchant for only useful ideas. Le Clerc notes that Locke  
was able to reason on the common affairs of Life, as well as on the most 
abstracted Subjects; and that he was none of those Philosophers, who spend their 
whole Lives, in the search after Truths purely Speculative, but by their Ignorance 
of those things which concern the publick Good, are rendred incapable of serving 
their Country.78 
Le Clerc noted that it was Lord Ashley (who later became the Earl of Shaftesbury), who 
encouraged Locke to shift his focus from medicine to public service, urging Locke to 
“apply himself to the study of those Matters, that belong’d to the Church and State, and 
which might have some relation to the business of a Minister of State.”79 Clearly seeing 
public service as a better use of Locke’s abilities, Coste notes that “Mr. Locke chiefly 
loved Truths that were useful, and with such fed his mind, and was generally very well 
pleased to make them the subject of his discourse.”80 Locke preferred only profitable 
ideas, as Taylor indicated under-laborers should. Whether Locke applied himself to 
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religion, medicine, or government, he always aimed at their improvement. Indeed, 
nowhere was was this most evident than in Locke’s interpersonal interactions. 
 Such social interaction is seen in the expectation that under-laborers avoid 
“ineffective Wit and Eloquence.” Coste, concerned primarily with Locke’s character, 
claims that Locke achieved renown for precisely this reason, recalling one instance, in 
which:  
when an occasion naturally offered, he gave himself up with pleasure to the 
charms of a free and facetious Conversation, He remembered a great many 
agreeable Stoics, which he always brought in properly; and generally made them 
yet more delightful, by his natural and agreeable way of telling them. He was no 
foe to Raillery, provided it were delicate and perfectly innocent.81 
Coste reveals Locke to be an effective communicator able to bring even the sophisticated 
thoughts of the stoics to an understandable level, and such tasteful presentation of ideas 
is a hallmark of Locke’s social interactions. In another anecdote, Coste recalls that 
Locke “always remembered this maxim of the Duke of La Rochefoucault, which he 
admired above all others, That Gravity is a mystery of the Body, invented to conceal the 
defects of the Mind.”82 Coste notes that Locke recalled this maxim whenever he “wou’d 
divert himself with imitating that study’d Gravity” of the haughty intellectuals he 
disdained.83 What Coste calls a “maxim” is, of course, a joke. “Gravity” describes both a 
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concept and a demeanor. As a concept, gravity “conceals the defects” of theory. As a 
demeanor, gravity “conceals the defects” of intelligence. This double entendre suggests 
that those of weak intelligence are pretentious in both the way they theorize and in the 
way they carry themselves. 
Under-laborers, although tasked with ministering to the people, are warned by 
Taylor to guard against becoming like those people, acquiring their demeanor and way 
of speaking. Furthermore, under-laborers must also guard against the negative influence 
of the populace, who may discourage them from their ministry: 
the Ministers of Christ must not be framed according to the peoples humour, they 
must not give him rules, nor describe his measures; but he should be a rule to 
them; he is neither to live with them so as to please their humours, or to preach 
Doctrines populo ut placerent quas fecissent fabulas.84   
Even in his use of wit and “raillery,” Locke was able to maintain the dignity expected of 
his social standing. When socializing amongst the genteel, Le Clerc notes that “Mr. 
Locke had a serious Air and always spoke to these Lords in a modest and respectful 
manner; yet there was an agreeable mixture of Wit in his Conversation.”85 To this point, 
Le Clerc tells of a time in which Locke was socializing with some lords, including 
Ashley. Unhappy with their vulgar conversation they had while playing cards, Le Clerc 
writes that Locke jotted down their dialogue. When questioned about what he was doing, 
Locke wittily said that he “set down the substance of what has been said within this hour 
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or two” because he had “the Honour of being present at a Meeting of the wisest and most 
ingenious men of the Age.” Le Clerc writes that the “noble Lords perceiv’d the banter, 
and diverted themselves a while with improving the jest; they left their play and enter’d 
into Conversation more agreeable to their Character and so spend the rest of the day.”86 
In this case, Locke managed to preserve not only his dignity, but also that of his 
associates, without letting any of them fall into vulgarity. Surely capable of interjecting 
levity into seriousness, Locke was equally capable of bringing seriousness to the vulgar. 
 This latter capacity speaks to the second aspect of the under-laborer, Taylor 
requires them to possess: “Integrity of Doctrine.” Among the qualities of such doctrine, 
Taylor requires that it be “pure” with “no Heretical mixtures,” void of “vain and empty 
notions, little contentions, and pitiful disputes,” and “not feeding the people with husks 
and drosse, with Colocynths and Gourds, with gay Tulips and useless Daffodils, but with 
the bread of life, and medicinal Plants.”87 The doctrines preached by the under-laborer, 
therefore, must be aimed solely at the improvement of lives and not distract the people 
from their edification: it must retain its seriousness in light of vulgarity. 
In his other interactions, Coste describes Locke as a benevolent counselor. Coste 
relates that Locke at one time thought that the maxim “good Counsels are very little 
effectual in making people more prudent” to be “very strange; but that experience had 
fully convinced him of the truth of it.”88 As Coste recounts, Locke would regularly give 
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unsolicited advice to people who, in his opinion, wanted it; however, he soon realized 
that people would only take his advice if they asked for it first. From that point on, 
according to Coste, Locke practiced self-restraint in giving only solicited advice. 
 At the same time, Coste reports that Locke would indeed at times give such 
advice anyway, because of “his natural Goodness, the aversion he had to Disorder, and 
the interest he took in those about him.” In such cases, Locke would present “with solid 
arguments” the advice which he thought “most likely to reclaim them.”89 Coste describes 
Locke’s approach to giving advice as “modest,” since he insisted that the force of his 
advice stem from rationality and argumentation, rather than his own authority or 
celebrity as an intellectual. 
Locke was not a member of the clergy, so the religious origin of the term “under-
labouring” and its associations with the ministry are worth noting, especially in light of 
accusations from his contemporaries that he was an atheist.  One particularly vitriolic 
line of this accusation came from William Carroll, a bishop in the Church of Ireland. 
 Carroll was concerned that Spinozism was being surreptitiously imported into 
the British Isles through the work of philosophers such as Samuel Clarke, Anthony 
Collins, and John Locke. Spinozism, which endorsed substance monism, was seen as a 
threat to Cartesianism, which endorsed substance dualism. The Anglican Church had 
already rejected Scholasticism (which, as we have seen, Locke rejected too, under the 
name “Peripatetick”), because that was the philosophy of the Roman Church. 
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Cartesianism was viewed as an appropriate alternative, because in endorsing the 
existence of two substances, it preserved a distinction between the God the creator and 
the creation. Spinozism, because it endorsed the existence of only one substance, denied 
any distinction between God and creation.90 The Spinozists could nevertheless insist that 
God existed, provided that “God” be understood as that one substance which has always 
existed. This insistence led Carroll to contrast “a God” of Spinozism with the “One Only 
True God” of religious orthodoxy.  
In 1705, Carroll wrote Remarks Upon Mr. Clarke’s Sermons (1705) in which he 
accused Clarke of surreptitiously endorsing atheism. Clarke, Carroll claims, professed to 
demonstrate God’s existence, yet “those Sermons are so far from Answering that End, 
that they absolutely cut off all possible Means of attaining it, and do rather Establish, 
than Destroy, that which they apparently take to Confute” (1).91 Carroll’s accusations are 
threefold. The first involves Clarke’s claim that “What the Substance or Essence of that 
Being, which is Self-Existent, or Necessarily-Existing, is; we have no Idea, neither is it 
possible for us in any measure to comprehend it.”92 Carroll names this the “skeptical 
hypothesis,” and his first accusation is that Clarke cannot simultaneously profess 
ignorance concerning the attributes of any substance, whilst rejecting the atheist’s claim 
that there is only one.93 His second accusation is that Clarke likewise cannot 
simultaneously adhere to the “sceptical hypothesis” and purport to prove the existence of 
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God. Indeed, Carroll asserts that the skeptical hypothesis precludes even the possibility 
of proving God’s existence. His third accusation is that Clarke, through his endorsement 
of the skeptical hypothesis, actually “establishes” and “confirms” the very atheism he 
purports to refute, which Carroll identifies as “Spinozism.”94  
   Although Clarke makes use of the “sceptical hypothesis,” according to Carroll 
he is hardly the first. Spinoza, he writes, “is the first to that ever reduced Atheism into a 
System, and Mr. Locke is the Second; with this Difference, that the latter has only copied 
the former as to the main, Spinoza having, as he imagined, established the Existence of 
his One single Substance, and cut off the Means of perceiving and proving, that there is 
more than One.”95 Indeed, Carroll claimed that “Mr. L.’s Essay, in the Main, is but 
Spinoza translated into, improved in the English Language, and set off more Subtilly 
under another Dress and Sett of articulate Sounds or Terms.”96 So, while Clarke may 
have utilized the “sceptical hypothesis,” Carroll finds its origins in Spinoza, and Locke, 
who imported Spinozism into the British Isles.  
 At the end of the treatise, Carroll suggests that Stillingfleet, Bishop of 
Worchester, correctly assessed Locke “as one Ignorant or Doubtful” concerning God. 
Carroll comments that “Never was any Man more exactly Represented, more like 
himself, more to the Life than Mr. L. thus Represented by that Great Prelate” and it was 
equally evident that “Mr. L. did not know what he said, That he was Unreasonable, that 
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he Reasoned himself out of Reason itself, in his Endeavours to Reason our Great God 
out of Being, and to establish Spinoza’s Hypothesis.”97 Carroll continued his scathing 
assessment of Locke in a more focused way in another treatise. 
There, in A Dissertation Upon the Tenth Chapter of the Fourth Book of Mr. 
Locke’s Essay, Concerning Human Understanding, Carroll singles out Locke’s 
demonstration for God’s existence (4.10) as that which “finally and compleatly 
establishes the Hypothesis” and which “Wherefore we may take this chap. to be the very 
Center, and the Touch-stone, if I may so speak, of the Essay of Humane 
Understanding”98 Carroll’s contention here, consistent with his remarks in Remarks on 
Mr. Clarke’s Sermons, is that “Mr. L. copied Spinoza” insofar as  
the one dream’d, and the other imagin’d after him, that the Nature of things is 
quite different from what it really is; and from what others know and take it to 
be; and accordingly have made the chief Words imploy’d by them, to stand for 
Ideas quite different from those, whereof others take and make them Signs or 
Marks, that is, take them in a Sense quite different from that, wherein others take 
and understand them.99  
Carroll’s accusation here is that Spinoza and Locke have perverted the meanings of 
words to such an extent that to a casual audience they appear to mean one thing, whilst 
to a more attentive reader (such a Carroll himself), they mean something quite different.  
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 Central to Carroll’s accusation is Locke’s usage of the word “God.” As Carroll 
observes, the title of Locke’s chapter at 4.10 is “Of Our Knowledge of the Existence of a 
God,” signaling to the reader that the “God” in question is “a peculiar sort of a God, 
different and distinct from what others call God singly.”100 Locke’s “peculiar” God 
emerges, according to Carroll, from the way he understands the word “being” and the 
attributes associated with that being: “Mr. L. after Spinoza asserts, That there is an 
Eternal, All Knowing, Cogitative Being. ’Tis the Christian Doctrine, and the Unanimous 
Vote of Mankind, That there is an Eternal, All Knowing, All Powerful, Cognitive 
Being.”101 An eternal, omniscient, and omnipotent being is ordinarily understood to 
mean “God” as a being who has always existed, knows everything, and can do 
everything; however, Locke uses these words differently with reference to the skeptical 
hypothesis. 
According to Carroll, Locke identifies eternity, omniscience, and omnipotence as 
attributes of a being, but of common understanding:  
the Word Being, is of singular Use to those men of One Substance, when they 
endeavour to establish their Hypothesis somewhat convertly; and ’tis not very 
easy to distinguish them from others, when they say with others, There is an 
Eternal, &c. Being; and by this Term, understand a Something, or Substance, 
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infinitely different from the Something, or Substance, which others understand by 
it, when they ascribe the same Attributes to it.”102 
On this reading, the eternal “being” in question is “substance,” and omnipotence and 
omniscience reference the qualities, powers, or properties which inhere in that substance, 
rather than the abilities to do anything and know everything. According to Carroll, “the 
Sence wherein he takes the Terms, most powerful, and ascribes that Attribute to his 
Eternal Being or Something, must be likewise different from that wherein others take 
those Words, when they ascribe that Attribute to the one only True God.”103  This 
“different Sence” of omnipotence is required by the skeptical hypothesis, since it 
precludes the existence of any more than one substance. This one substance, “which 
cannot possibly create any other real Substance,” can only create “various Alterations or 
Changes in its own Modifications.”104 In other words, according to Carroll’s reading, 
Locke’s true position is that there is nothing that is not God, because everything is a 
modification of one substance. From this, Carroll concludes that Locke and Spinoza 
maintain the position  
That the GOD, or Eternal, Thinking Being, whose Existence those Authors 
maintain, is nothing else precisely, but the whole World or Universe, and the 
Concomitants of this Hypothesis, as for instance; That all Things are equally 
Eternal, various Changes of Modifications, only excepted.105 
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The skeptical hypothesis, in Carroll’s eyes, requires Spinoza and Locke to be committed 
to the view that only one substance exists, and all things are really just modes of that one 
substance. Therefore, everything that exists, has existed from eternity. For Carroll and 
the other orthodox clergy, this represents a clear instance of heterodoxy, since it 
dissolves the division between God the eternal creator and the temporal creation. 
Toward the end of end of the treatise, Carroll writes that “We have now read all 
that I intended to publish against the Essay of Human Understanding, before Mr. Locke 
died; to which I shall now add a few observations.”106 His use of the past tense indicates 
that by the time of its publication, Locke was already deceased. After this point, only 18 
pages of text remain in the Dissertation, and from Carroll’s remark here, they evidently 
contain material inspired by Locke’s passing in that they address the place of the Essay 
and Locke’s other texts among the other heterodox authors (including Clarke, as we 
have seen).   
 Carroll suggests that the Essay was published in a conspiratorial fashion to 
render the skeptical hypothesis palatable for popular consumption. Seeing the rejection 
of Spinoza by “Men of all Persuasions,” Carroll claims that Locke consciously utilized a 
more subversive strategy.  According to Carroll, “The first Step he made to convey it in 
Maskerade, was, to have an Extract of it made, and publish’d in the French Language, in 
a Book which runs over all Europe, namely, Mr. le Clerc’s Bibl. Univer. Tom. 8.”107 
Carroll here is referring to the Bibliotheque universelle et historique, published by Jean 
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Le Clerc. This periodical contained a redacted version of the Essay in French, which in 
Carroll’s eyes was to herald the arrival of the full Essay itself. The effect of this 
abstracted version of the Essay was to make the reader believe the full text was about 
God, when it was really about “the Existence of an External Being,” by which “the 
Reader understood the One Only True GOD, and upon this Account was prejudic’d in 
favour of, and believ’d the Essay of Human Understanding, to be a quite different Book, 
from what it really is, ev’n before it appear’d. This, you see, was very well contriv’d.”108 
Carroll adds that it was only when the Essay was published in full that effects of Locke’s 
contrivances could be seen more clearly: 
Now the Prejudices procur’d in favour of that Book, before it appear’d, the 
Legion of Sophisms and Equivocations which screen’d in its real Sense from the 
Reader, after it appear’d, and the good Language wherein ’tis writ; have been 
powerful Instruments of imposing upon the Publick, of passing that Book upon 
it, for what it really is not, and of compassing Mr. L’s Design, of establishing and 
spreading Spinoza’s Hypothesis in Disguise.109 
As Carroll says, the public was “dupp’d”—not into merely believing the skeptical 
hypothesis, but those authors who employed it, as we have seen in the case of Clarke. 
Among those other texts that depend on the skeptical hypothesis and its commitments, 
Carroll lists: The Reasonableness of Christianity by John Locke, Christianity Not 
Mysterious by John Toland, and The Rights of the Christian Church Asserted by 
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Matthew Tindal.110 As with the Essay, these texts also perverted the meanings of 
familiar words. For them, according to Carroll, the “Christian Church” is “a Society of 
Reasonable Men,” “Christianity” is “the Profession of a Society of Reasonable Men,” 
“Reason” is “a Modification of their pretended One Only Cognitive and Extended 
Material Substance, of their God,” and “Christ” merely has “a larger Share” of this “than 
to any other.”111 The legacy of Locke, in Carroll’s eyes, was to have systemized atheism 
so as to make it appropriable by other authors:  
And as for that Hypothesis itself, it is the very same that all the Atheists which 
ever were, did establish and maintain; for they were all of them without 
exception, that is, the few of them we have upon Record, Materialists. All that 
Spinoza and M. L. have done, is to endeavour to give that Hypothesis a 
Systematical Consistency.112 
So, Carroll identifies as an “atheist” anyone who utilizes the skeptical hypothesis in the 
writings. As we have seen, this includes not only, of course, Spinoza and Locke, but also 
Clarke, Toland, and Tindal. Additionally, he also identifies Anthony Collins, the author 
of An Essay Concerning the Use of Reason in Propositions113, and even Jean Le 
Clerc.114 
 So, in the immediate aftermath of his death, Locke’s contemporaries debated his 
legacy as a religious thinker. His earliest biographers, Le Clerc and Coste, insisted on his 
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religiosity, recalling stories of his pious character. Likewise, adversaries such as Carroll 
looked to his work and saw evidence of “atheism.” This dichotomy as to whether or not 
Locke was an atheist or theist seems complicated by his professed vocation as an 
“under-labourer”—a word rooted in the expressly religious texts of Taylor, yet 
employed by Locke for seemingly secular concerns. In yet another strain, central to 
Locke’s “under-labouring” was the realigning of words with the ideas they represent: a 
“realignment” interpreted by Carroll as conspiratorial and subversive. Central to all of 
this debate was Locke’s degree of heterodoxy and whether or not that heterodoxy was 
accepted by the public. If the generation of his death fretted about Locke’s “atheism,” or 
at least concerned enough to keep it quiet, in only 30 years that heterodoxy would be 
celebrated.  
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CHAPTER IV 
LOCKE AS CORRECT REASONER, 1734 
 
In 1733 the Gentleman’s Magazine held a contest to commemorate the completion of a 
grotto in Richmond Park, built at the behest of Queen Caroline. The contest solicited 
poetry submissions from readers of the Gentleman in commemoration of the installation 
of a bust of Robert Boyle at the grotto. Those submitting were asked to send their poetry 
in a way that disguised their identities:  
The Respective Authors, are desired to send their Performances directed to St. 
John’s Gate, and to distinguish their Papers, (after the manner of the Academy of 
Paris) by some Sentence, Token or Device, to be cover’d with white Paper 
sealed over it, which shall not be taken off until the Prize is declar’d.”115  
The submission themselves were specifically requested to be “On the Bust of the Hon. 
Robert Boyle Esq; being set up in her Majesty’s Hermitage at Richmond.”116 Queen 
Caroline’s own motivations for constructing the grotto explain why the editors had these 
expectations. Michael Charlesworth observes that “certain types of garden features were 
particularly aligned with certain tendencies in religious thought. Deism, for example, 
was explicitly associated with hermitages by the very famous example built by Queen 
Caroline at Richmond Gardens in 1732.”117 The Queen’s construction of the grotto is 
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harmonious with her character insofar as “the image of Caroline as a protestant heroine 
was promoted in Britain” and that “Caroline consciously projected an image of herself as 
a promoter of enlightened ideas,” with the construction of the grotto being just on 
example.118 
Evidently, in commissioning the grotto and its busts, Her Majesty thought she 
was building a monument to deism, which accounts for the sample poems speaking to 
the themes of the light of reason (precipitated by Boyle) and the natural religion 
(discoverable by that reason). What the editors received, however, was something quite 
different, as the submissions themselves shifted the emphasis from religion to 
nationalism. Rather than speaking to deism and its emergence with Boyle, the poems 
spoke to a distinctively British way of thinking and its beginnings with not only Boyle, 
but also Clarke, Wollaston, Newton, and—of course, Locke. 
The grotto itself was a structure that contained the busts of Samuel Clarke, 
William Wollaston, Isaac Newton, and John Locke. As described by a note the 
magazine, these “4 Busts so often mention’d, stand in Niches at each quarter in the 
Walls of the Vaulted Dome.” It was the addition of a bust of Robert Boyle that prompted 
the contest, since it suggested the grotto was complete—at least for a time. As the 
magazine describes: “the Bust of Mr Boyle stands higher than these, on a Pedestal, in the 
inmost, and, as it were, the most sacred Recess of the Place.” The decoration around 
Boyle’s likeness reinforced his place of prominence, but also indicated the relationship 
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of his likeness with the other bust, since “behind his head a large Golden Sun, darting his 
wide spreading Beams all about, and towards the others, to whom his Aspect is 
directed.” The rays beaming from Boyle to the others suggest the light of reason 
emanating from Boyle to Clarke, Wollaston, Newton, and Locke. Without Boyle, the 
grotto’s message would be incomplete, although room was made for additional busts, as 
the Gentleman’s Magazine further mention: “To the Dome is an Iron Door by which you 
enter, on each side of it an Apartment to which are Iron Rails; and each of these 
Apartments is capable of Receiving more Busts, if her Majesty should think proper in 
her Wisdom to add any to the Number already there.”119 It is this tableau that the poets 
were prompted to memorialize in verse, and—as suggested by the samples included with 
the prompt—they were expected to do so in a way that spoke to Boyle’s preeminence 
among the other men, as well as their shared endorsement of deism. 
 To indicate their expectations, the Gentleman’s Magazine included sample 
poems just before the actual notice of the contest, within which the editors note that with 
respect to the samples, “We are satify’d this Hint would be sufficient to bring us a 
Supply.”120 In all, the editors provide five examples to solicit submissions. Because these 
samples were written prior to the installation of Boyle’s likeness in the grotto, the editors 
of the magazine supplied tentative lines referring to Boyle, offset by brackets and an 
asterisk. The original five poems themselves spoke to the theme of deism or natural 
religion, while the inserted material spoke to Boyle.  
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The first one describes Newton “Whose spreading Beams enlighten Foreign/ 
Lands” and whose task it was to “trace the starry Wonders of th’ Ethereal Space.” The 
others, Locke, Wollaston, and Clarke follow Newton’s lead: 
 While Locke with native Force of Reason charms, 
And Wollaston by Strokes of Nature warms: 
While Piety and Learning both conspire 
In Clarke, to fan Religion’s sacred Fire; 
Whose milder Rules, to Souls by Passion driv’n, 
Still kindly point the certain road to Heav’n; 
These original lines clearly imagine the beam of the sun as the light of reason, as well as 
include a notable religious tenor. The insertion on Boyle—provided by the editors, and 
not original to the poem—confirm the appeal of these themes:  
 [While Boyle, whose philosophic Eye cou’d trace 
 The mystic Lines of Nature’s various Face, 
 Shall, like the Sun, diffusive Beams impart, 
 Inlight’ning all the mazey Wilds of Art;]*121 
Boyle, the insertion suggests, could detect the “mystic” appearance of nature, as well as 
“diffuse” that insight to others. Newton, from the first lines, merely spread this light to 
“foreign lands.” It was Boyle, however, who originated them. 
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 Likewise, another sample poem which asks Queen Caroline to “Let Hobbs, the 
Doubtful, make the set compleat,” is answered by an entire stanza set off by a “[*],” 
indicating it is furnished by the editors and is not original to the poetry: 
 Cease envious Muse! to fully thus the Great; 
 Nor strive the noblest Actions to defeat; 
See! Boyle, that Sun of Knowledge, claims 
the Umpire Seat.122 
Again, the motif of Boyle as the “Sun of Knowledge” diffusing the light of reason is 
clearly expressed. What may be less obvious is the religious allusion in this short poem. 
The original poet, recall, suggests that the Queen include “Hobbs, the Doubtful,” 
apparently referencing Hobbes skepticism concerning religion. Hobbes held that 
religious truth was discovered only by interrogating the will of the sovereign, not 
through illumination by the light of reason. The rejection of Hobbes’ inclusion appears 
to be on these grounds: Boyle, the preeminent source of the light of reason—the 
“Umpire Seat”—must reject anyone who teaches that religious truth is not found in 
nature.  
 Another sample poem omits the sun imagery, but amplifies the expressly 
religious message of the grotto, in the form of satire. The poem considers the busts as 
“Idols four—of Wizzards three,/ And one unchristian Parson.” The “idols,” of course, 
are Locke, Wollaston, Clarke, and Newton, and the “unchristian Parson” in question is 
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identified as Clarke in the subsequent lines: “In praise of Clarke—observe the Joke—/ 
Writes ev’ry Band and Gown.” The “joke” is Clarke’s apparent atheism, or at least 
deism, that seemed to underlie his sermons (the Boyle Lecture), criticized by William 
Carroll.  Locke himself is associated with the royal courts, despite his writings against 
them: “And Locke’s the Theme of courtly Folk,/ Who lov’d nor Court nor Crown.” In 
jest, the poet reveals that lest posterity “Leave uninscrib’d this Wall” (referring to the 
wall of the grotto), if “the honest Stones but speak,/ They’d contradict you all.”123 This 
poem is presented as a note found behind the one of the busts in the grotto, which lends 
it an ominous and urgent character. It is seemingly a note to both the visitor to the grotto 
(who would have to be in the midst of the busts to acquire it) and to potential poets in the 
contest (who would be read this before the context prompt on the next page).  
 The inserted material, again furnished by the editors, augments this message by 
questioning the character of those who would consider such misrepresentation. On one 
hand, such a poet should not participate, because the subject matter would be beyond 
understanding: 
 Poor snarling Bard, who e’er thou art, 
 To scold at Things above thy Reach; 
 Thus Reynard said, the Grapes are tart; 
 And Vice will Virtue still impeach. 
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With the reference to Reynard the Fox, the editors warn that even well-meaning poets 
(of “Virtue”) will still be punished (“impeached” by “Vice”) if they attempt to write 
about the great men represented in the grotto. In other words, such attempts will appear 
foolish, “Should’st thou go on, thou thoughtless Head,/ Thoul’t make these stony 
Bustoes speak.124 Any submissions, therefore, must avoid any reckless portrayal. 
 The last sample poem the editors include is likewise expressly religious. In it, the 
poet holds that the laws of nature that Clarke, Locke, Wollaston, and Newton have 
discovered serve to augment human life:  
They all, or sciences abstruse explain, 
Check lawless power, and human rights maintain, 
Religion’s rules on nature built define, 
Or christian revelation prove divine: 
Nature, then, as discovered by these men, allows religious truth to be accessed, in 
addition to revealing the political laws governing society. The editors specifically single 
out these aspects of the original poem, by adding the exhortation to 
 Trace reason’s rules, abuse of power disdain, 
 Christian religion as divine, maintain, 
 And by such models think, and act, and reign.125 
The editors, then, envision the busts as modeling how one should examine nature to 
acquire these truths of religion and politics. All of the editions made by the editors 
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suggest that they were soliciting poetry submissions that either placed particular 
emphasis on Boyle, or that were expressly religious in their content. 
 By contrast, the actual poems submitted to the editors portray Britain as a nation 
of intellectuals, memorialized by the grotto: the effect of which is to foster aspirations to 
the life of the mind and the corresponding contributions to the nation.126 This theme is 
captured particularly well by Essay VII, which notes the nationalist fervor Queen 
Caroline inspired “By hon’ring these great names in lasting stone,/ To ev’ry British heart 
thou hast endear’d thine own.”127 As these lines suggest, the “great names” honored in 
the grotto, however, were not so acclaimed for deism; rather, they were celebrated for 
the (superior) system of thought they offered compared to the rest of Europe. Indeed, 
even the great scientists of continental Europe are portrayed as acknowledging the 
superiority of English thought, in this case embodied in Newton: 
 Huygenius, Tycho, Kepler, high in fame, 
 Bow to the honours of an English name. 
 The system never was from errors free 
 Till Newton rose and said, Let darkness flee. 
To be sure, Poet VII acknowledges the contributions made by other European scientists 
to building the new “system” of science. It was Newton, however, who ultimately 
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brought that system to perfection by purging it of errors which had henceforth been 
insurmountable.  
 Poet VII praises Locke in a similar way, noting that in his Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, “Laborious knowledge teems in every line,/ And Plato’s fam’d 
ideas yield to thine.” Poet VII asserts the superiority of Locke’s philosophy to Plato’s for 
the same reason that Coste asserted the superiority of Locke’s character over those of his 
contemporaries, namely: his moderation. According to Poet VII, Locke’s 
accomplishments in this regard are to “disembarrass us of prejudice,” “mark th’ 
extremes of reason and caprice,” and “range in quest of truth without unjust control.” In 
a word, Locke delineated the capacity of our reason, thereby divesting us of “Plato’s 
fam’d ideas,” or any fantastical ideas ungrounded in reality, yet nevertheless presumed 
to be knowledge. By demarcating what reason cannot do, Locke effectively spelled out 
what it can. As Poet VII further notes, Locke “teachest how by conscious mental act/ We 
form associate notions, and abstract,” which populate “th’ original and vast extent/ Of 
thought, belief, opinion, and assent.” Locke’s legacy, therefore, was to show that the 
mind plays an active role in the formation of ideas, and is not a mere passive receiver of 
“Plato’s fam’d ideas,” as contemporary philosophers on the continent would otherwise 
have it. 
 The contest featured eleven submissions total, and the other poems submitted to 
the contest refer to this same activity of the mind as “power,” evidently using Locke’s 
own term for the active and passive qualities of the mind from his Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding. In Essay VI, for instance, Poet VI identifies Locke’s chief 
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accomplishment as elucidating “the human soul’s extensive pow’rs,”128 which is its 
ability to form ideas. Interestingly, Poet VI also identifies this as Queen Caroline’s “own 
great theme” undertaken during “her studious hours.” Such elevation of thinking, 
however, is limited to neither Locke nor Her Majesty; rather, according to the poet, such 
thinking is open to everybody, since it is the grotto’s primary function to inspire 
“thoughts sublime, which raise the mind/ Above the trifling cares of humankind.” The 
likenesses depicted in the busts represented men who exemplified the life of the mind, 
lives Queen Caroline now exhorts others to follow. 
 Essay VIII too identifies Locke as someone “who with laborious search defin’d/ 
The powers, and compass, of the human mind.”129 The author of Essay VIII is known to 
be the Reverend Moses Brown.130 As was the case with Essay VI, Brown identifies 
Locke’s chief accomplishment as mapping out the mind’s “power,” or active capacity. 
Like Essay VII, Brown too identifies this accomplishment as a “labour,” which is not 
insignificant considering the significance that Locke’s self-identification as an “under-
labourer” had for his early biographers. More than a mere facet occupation, Locke’s 
“labouring” had, for the poets, become the means by which discoveries of the mind had 
been made and his place among British intellectuals established. It was the emphasis on 
reason and the powers of the mind that was taken up by the other poets in their 
submissions.  
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 Essay IX, for example, speaks to this same theme of reason’s activity, but rather 
than speaking to the discovery of the “powers” of the mind as Locke’s chief 
accomplishment, it focuses—like Essay VII—on Locke’s dispelling of fanciful ideas 
which had hitherto counted as knowledge. It was in the wake of Boyle’s reform of 
natural philosophy, Poet IX writes, that  
There Locke we view, whose matchless skill 
Taught feeble reason how to climb; 
And curbing fancy’s headstrong will 
Makes wit with judgment sweetly chime.131 
By “curbing fancy’s headstrong will,” the tendency of the mind to be distracted from 
reality, Locke enabled reason to go further (“to climb”) than ever before. In fact, Poet IX 
asserts that Locke, along with the other men represented in the grotto, surpass even the 
gods of antiquity: 
 Not antient Rome’s admired fane, 
  Where all their fabled gods did dwell, 
 Equals this small selected train, 
  Or rivals Carolina’s cell.132 
Poet IX contrasts a shrine from antiquity (a “fane”) built as a home for gods, with the 
Queen’s grotto built for a small group of men. The contrast suggested is one of falsity 
with truth: with the passage of time comes an abandonment of old gods (falsity), but also 
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the acceptance and celebration of the new ways of thinking represented by the men 
(truth). It is also worth noting that Poet IX refers to the grotto as “Carolina’s cell”—a 
motif employed in the other essays, and one that has significant import for the discussion 
of Locke that would take place within the next thirty years in the context of British 
nationalism. 
 In addition to Essay IX, Essays I, V, VI, VIII, IX, and XI all refer to the grotto as 
Queen Caroline’s “cell.” Essay I, for example, is known to be written by John Duick.133 
Duick exhorts us to “Behold her venerable cell!” Poet V remarks that “Her Grotto 
venerably wild,/ Seems like Calypso’s fabled cell,” which “Here Carolina, sapient 
Queen,/ Revolves the labours of the wise.” PoetVI notes that it is in the grotto that “the 
solitary Queen” retreats to “her humble Cell, and turns her eyes/ Where the five 
venerable Bustoes rise.” According to Brown, the author of Essay VIII, upon a visit to 
the grotto, the Queen’s “venerable Cell survey,/ And to its honour’d guests our solemn 
visit pay.” Poet XI, lastly, refers to the grotto as “Carolina’s contemplative cell.” As we 
have seen even in the mentions of Locke alone, Her Majesty was depicted as partaking 
in the same intellectual life as the men she memorialized within the grotto. We have also 
noted that Locke, Wollaston, Newton, Clarke, and Boyle were interpreted by these same 
poets as representing different aspects of newfound British way of thinking; however, as 
a structure comparable to a shrine or temple, it was a place people were expected to visit, 
in order to be inspired by such thought. In this same light, as a “cell” of the Queen, it 
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was a place of isolation, solitude, and private contemplation, a place removed from the 
rest of the world.  
 On a national level, this decidedly monastic language portrays Britain as an 
incubator of intellectualism, a point made salient by an anecdote alluded to by Brown. 
The poet addresses Her Majesty directly: 
 Yet if, illustrious Queen, her fond request 
 The muse might offer, to thy gen’rous breast, 
 When with like favours thy unwearied hand 
 Prepares a-new to bless a grateful land, 
 Thy Milton, oh! thy Britain’s Orpheus grace, 
 And introduce him to the sacred race; 
In alluding to “Thy Milton,” Brown recalls an anecdote found in Voltaire’s Letters in 
which Queen Caroline is said to have taken care of one of Milton’s daughters when it 
was discovered that she was impoverished. As Voltaire writes, “’Tis she, who being 
inform’d that a Daughter of Milton was living, but in miserable Circumstances, 
immediately sent her a considerable Present.”134 Brown compares the Queen’s care for 
one of Milton’s daughters to the Queen’s care for Britain’s intellectual heritage. By 
memorializing the nation’s intellectuals within the grotto, she ensured the survival of 
their future memory, just as donating to Milton’s daughter ensured her own survival and 
a very much living part of England’s preeminent poet.   
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 Within a single generation after his death, Locke had become an integral part of 
England’s intellectual heritage, and Queen Caroline memorialized this in the grotto, 
ensuring his perseverance as such. Locke’s status as one of England’s most brilliant 
intellectuals endured well into the next generation as well.   
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CHAPTER V 
LOCKE AS REFORMER, 1764 
 
In 1761, seemingly confirming the premonitions of the grotto, Oliver Goldsmith wrote in 
his Memoirs of Monsieur de Voltaire that “England, about this time, was coming into 
repute thro’ Europe, as the land of philosophers. Newton, Locke, and others began to 
attract the attention of the curious, and drew hither a concourse of learned men from 
every part of Europe.”135 A mere three years later, in 1764, Goldsmith suggests that their 
reputation had become firmly established, writing, “That spirit of philosophy which had 
been excited in former ages, still continued to operate with the greatest success, and 
produced the greatest men in every profession.”136 Among the philosophers mentioned 
by Goldsmith are three of the five men featured in the grotto: Newton, Clarke, and 
Locke. Among all the English philosophers, Goldsmith identifies Locke as the greatest 
since it is he “who may be justly said to have reformed all our modes of thinking in 
metaphysical inquiry.”137 What in previous generations had been identified as “under-
labouring” or “correct reasoning” had now come to be called “reforming.”  
As a reformer, Locke and his philosophy had come to acquire a decidedly 
historical character as responding to the theoretical issues of the day, as Goldsmith 
writes,  
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Though the jargon of schools had been before him arraigned, yet several of their 
errors had still subsisted, and were regarded as true. Locke therefore set himself 
to overturn their systems, and refute their absurdities; these he effectually 
accomplished; for which reason his book, which, when published, was of infinite 
service; it may be found less useful at present, when the doctrines it was 
calculated to refute, are no longer subsisting.138  
Two generations after his death, Locke’s philosophy was already viewed as dated, 
although still regarded as important in the establishment of the now-celebrated English 
way of doing philosophy. Remarking on the grotto, which by this time had become a 
distant memory, Benjamin Martin remarked that with regard to Locke: 
His Character has been often attempted, particularly by Mr. Peter Coste, his 
Companion and Amanuensis: But the highest Elogium upon him was certainly 
that of the late Queen Caroline, who erected a Pavilion in Richmond Park in 
Honour of Philosophy, where she placed our Author’s Bust on a Level with 
Bacon, Newton, and Clarke, as the four principal English Virtuosi.——But this 
Parallel will not meet with much Approbation from those who best understand  
Nature and Science.139  
It was Boyle’s likeness, of course, which was featured in the Grotto, not Bacon’s; 
however, Martin’s point still is clear: unlike Queen Caroline, who regarded the grotto as 
monument to deism, or those submitting poetry to the contest, which regarded it as a 
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monument to Englishness, Martin instead understood it as a monument to natural 
philosophy. Because of this, Martin suggests that the inclusion of Locke among the great 
natural philosophers may not be as appropriate as it may once have been, at least by the 
standards of contemporary science. Martin’s observation compliments that of Goldsmith, 
since both note Locke’s historical importance in establishing England’s intellectual 
legacy, while downplaying the relevance of his ideas in 1764. 
 While his ideas may have been antiquated, Locke himself was anything but 
obsolete. Regarded now as perhaps ‘England’s philosopher,’ he was injected to the 
center of a mid-eighteenth-century foreign policy debate.  In 1764, Richard Hurd 
published Dialogues on the Uses of Foreign Travel in which he relates a series of 
conversations between a fictitious “Mr. Locke” and a fictitious “Lord Shaftesbury.”140  
 Richard Hurd was born in 1720, sixteen years after the death of Locke, and so 
had no memory of the actual man. He was a member of the clergy in the Church of 
England, eventually becoming a bishop.141 His dialogues are narrated by “Lord 
Shaftesbury” as a series of conversations he had with “Mr. Locke” as to whether or not 
travel outside of Britain is necessary for the development of an English gentleman. 
Presented as found text, the dialogues are dated as being from the year 1700; however, 
within the text itself we also get some indication as to their intended context. In his 
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preamble, “Lord Shaftesbury” remarks that omitting the circumstances of their 
conversation is entirely permissible, because such 
punctilios of decorum are thought too constraining, and, as such, are widely laid 
aside, by the early moderns. the very notion of Dialogue, such as it was in the 
politest ages of antiquity, is so little comprehended in our days that I question 
much, if these papers were to fall into other hands, than your own, whether they 
would not appear in a high degree fantastic or visionary.142 
These offhand remarks serve the twofold purpose of presenting the dialogues as “found” 
and explicitly situating the conversation itself within the “early” modern period, which 
“Lord Shaftesbury” evidently regarded as an age in which philosophical discourse was 
confined to peers. “Lord Shaftesbury’s” reference to the “early” modern period is 
significant, as it only meaningful relative to the “modern” period, which is Hurd’s own.  
 Furthermore, the dialogues appear “found” to us, because “Lord Shaftesbury” 
remarks that he recorded them for benefit of another author, Robert Molesworth. Unlike 
Hurd, Molesworth was a contemporary of Locke’s, living from 1656-1725. Significant 
to his role here, Molesworth was appointed as an envoy to Denmark by King William in 
1689, an experience which was formative in his political outlook. This time in Denmark 
engendered him feelings of resentment and hostility toward the Danes, in particular what 
he perceived as their authoritarian government. His publication of An Account of 
Denmark in 1692 captured his resentment of the Danes, subsequently ending any further 
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relationship he might have with them, as well as frustrated foreign relations between 
Denmark and the king.143 “Lord Shaftesbury” expressly identifies the purposes of the 
dialogues to Molesworth as “putting into your hands a faithful account of his sentiments 
on the conduct and use of Travelling: Especially, as you will perceive at the same time 
what my notions are (if that be any importance to you) on the same subject.”144 So, the 
dialogues are framed as private advice on the uses of travel, and that advice is purported 
to come through the words of Shaftesbury and Locke. 
In his Account of Denmark,  Molesworth considers the worth of travel outside of 
England as akin to observing the progression of a disease, thereby acquiring an 
appreciation for health, without experiencing that disease for oneself, writing: “Want of 
Liberty is a Disease in any Society or Body Politick, like want of Health in a particular 
Person, and as the best way to understand the nature of Distemper aright is to consider it 
in several Patients.”145 The English in particular, Molesworth contends, not only have an 
urgent reason to undertake such travel but also have the resources to do so: they, in his 
words, “may propose to reap greater benefit by Travel, and yet none have practiced it 
less.”146 According to Molesworth, it is the wealth of England that affords the ability to 
travel, and the instability of England which compels it.  
Molesworth observes that England has a history of political turmoil, rendering its 
constitution precarious and in need of preservation. This, he thinks, can be remedied by 
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travel: “Methinks a method to preserve our Commonwealth in its legal state of Freedom, 
without the necessity of a Civil War once or twice every Age, were a benefit worth 
searching for, though we went to the furthest corners of the world in quest of it.”147 
Compelled to travel for so weighty a reason, Molesworth now considers just who is to 
undertake such a grave journey. Travel, he writes, “is more incumbent on the Gentlemen 
of England than any others,” because it is this social class that governs the country.148 
Furthermore, such a task is even more critical, because at this time in 1694, Molesworth 
notes that, “the eyes of most part of the World are now upon us, and take their measures 
from our Councils.”149 With the eyes of the world shifting to England, Molesworth turns 
his attention to England’s current travel practices.  
 Molesworth bemoans England’s habit of sending abroad uneducated and 
immature children. He claims that parents would send their children abroad the intention 
of receiving a return on their investment; instead, they actually lost more than they 
gained. Inveighing against this practice, Molesworth comments: “We send them abroad 
Children, and bring them home great boys,” meaning that the children have actually 
learnt nothing, returning home with equal or perhaps greater immaturity.150 Molesworth 
lists the losses incurred by sending such children abroad: “Foppishness” at the expense 
of their religion, “Pageantry, Luxury, and Licentiousness” at the expense of their 
government, and “gilded Slavery” at the expense of liberty. 151 All of these things, are 
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demanded by the youth upon their return, and if not met cause them to “exclaim against 
their old fashion’d Country-men, who will not reform the Constitution according to the 
new foreign Mode.”152 If anything is to gained by children sent abroad, Molesworth 
thinks, it is knowledge of other languages; however, this singular benefit is fall 
outweighed by the detrimental attitudes and beliefs they bring home upon their return. 
 Instead, Molesworth argues that it is men who should be traveling abroad, 
because they have both the education and maturity to make sense of what they observe 
and experience, without impulsively dispensing with everything from their home 
country. As Molesworth writes: “the travelling recommended here is that of Men, who 
set out so well stock’d with the knowledge of their own Country, as to be able to 
compare it with others, whereby they may both supply it where they find it wanting, and 
set a true value on’t where it excels.”153 Thus, in order to make England a peaceful 
nation that does not continually resort to civil turmoil and war to solve its constitutional 
problems, travelers are needed to anticipate and correct those problems before they end 
in social turmoil. To make this happen, travelers must be well-versed in their home 
country before they observe others—something which Molesworth thinks is best 
accomplished by philosophers. 
 Rather than inciting the youth to rebellion, Molesworth believes that 
philosophers instead encourage patriotism. It is the priests, he claims, that have fostered 
attitudes of insolence towards liberty. In fact, when the English youth go abroad to the 
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European continent, they encounter entire countries run by priests. In commenting on 
these countries, Molesworth writes:  
Had these Countries, whilst they were free, committed the Government of their 
Youth to Philosophers instead of Priests, they had in all probability preserv’d 
themselves from the yoak of Bondage to this day, whereas now they not only 
endure it, but approve of it likewise.154  
The priests, in other words, encourage bondage, while the philosophers encourage 
freedom. Philosophers encourage freedom by teaching civic virtues to the youth, 
including patriotic duty and respect for the rule of law, as well as moral virtues which 
support these. In Molesworth’s eyes, England faces continual political upheaval 
precisely because such virtues have not only filed to be instilled, but have increasingly 
been undermined by the youth returning home: “The managers of our modern Education 
have not been quite so publick Spirited, for it has been, as I have shewn, for the most 
part in the hands of Men who have a distinct Interest from the Publick.”155 
 Hurd’s Dialogues are framed as “Lord Shaftesbury’s” response to Molesworth, 
which is in keeping with the work’s purported setting, as Locke, Shaftesbury, and 
Molesworth were all contemporaries. Specifically, “Lord Shaftesbury” purports to be 
responding to Molesworth’s “Letter of Inquiry,” commenting to Molesworth that, “it 
looks as if you wanted to draw from me a confirmation of your own sentiments, rather 
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than a candid examination of them.”156 Molesworth, in other words, is portrayed as 
soliciting confirmation from “Lord Shaftesbury” for his own views on travel. Having 
made these views clear in his Account of Denmark, we know that Molesworth’s position 
is that only educated English gentlemen should travel abroad, and when they do, they 
should keep an eye for improvements of the fatherland.   
 “Lord Shaftesbury” then relates to Molesworth that he “just then happened to 
amuse” himself “with recollecting a conversation, which, not many days before, had 
passed between me and a certain philosopher of great note, on that very subject.”157 That 
“great philosopher,” he had in mind was “Mr. Locke.” Describing his opinion of the 
philosopher, “Lord Shaftesbury” notes that, while his moral philosophy “is too modern 
for my relish,” both he and Molesworth should listen to “Mr. Locke” when it comes to 
travel, because, “no man is more able, than Mr. Locke, or more privileged by his long 
experience, to give us Lectures on the good old chapter of Education.”158 From this, 
Hurd positions both “Lord Shaftesbury” and Molesworth as interlocutors to “Mr. 
Locke.” In other words, “Mr. Locke” is positioned as educating them both at the same 
time. 
 It is worth noting that throughout his Dialogues on travel, Hurd provides hints 
situating the dialogue within its “early” modern period. This, of course, is understood in 
contrast with Hurd’s own (1764) “modern” period. Both, however, are understood in 
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relation to those periods that came before them. From the very start of their dialogue, 
this is evident in “Lord Shaftesbury’s” begging the pardon of Molesworth for the lack of 
explicit old-fashioned content at the beginning of the dialogues (as one would, perhaps, 
find in a dialogue of Plato). Writing about his conversation with “Mr. Locke,” he 
explains: “If I composing a Dialogue in the old mimetical form, I should tell you, 
perhaps, the occasion that led us into this track of conversation;” however, he is not 
writing according to archaic rules, but rather to distinctly modern ones, since nowadays 
he notes, “these punctilios of decorum are thought too constraining, and, as such, are 
wisely laid, by the early moderns.”159 Having laid out the composition of the dialogue, 
“Lord Shaftesbury” now relates his conversation with “Mr. Locke.” 
 “Lord Shaftesbury” purposes the main question of the dialogue to “Mr. Locke,” 
as to whether travel is the best way to educate England’s youth: “And is not travelling 
then, in your opinion, one of the best of those methods, which can be taken to polish and 
form the manners of our liberal youth, and to fit them for the business and conversation 
of the world?”160 Just as Hurd framed Molesworth as seeking confirmation of his views 
from “Lord Shaftesbury,” he now frames “Lord Shaftesbury” as also seeking 
confirmation of his own views from “Mr. Locke.” Evidently, “Lord Shaftesbury” is of 
the position that that travel is indeed among the best methods for educating English 
youth. “Mr. Locke,” however, will not agree.  
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 Responding to his assertion, “Mr. Locke” declares: “I think not” insofar “as 
travel is considered as a part of early tutorage and education, I see nothing but mischiefs 
spring from it”161 “Lord Shaftesbury” then attempts to argue, perhaps alluding to the 
experience of Molesworth, that his personal experiences in travel have greatly enhanced 
his education. “Mr. Locke” replies that in this, “as in other cases, the rule is general, tho’ 
with some exceptions.”162 In response to this rebuke, Lord Shaftesbury” reformulates his 
question, asking: 
Whether, in general, Travel be not an excellent school for our ingenuous and 
noble youth; and whether it may not, on the whole, deserve the countenance of a 
philosopher, who understands the world, and his himself been formed by it?163 
“Mr. Locke,” insists that philosophy has always been against travel as a general rule, and 
that the ancient Greek philosophers that “Lord Shaftesbury” cites as his examples were 
merely responding to the demands of their era, in which wisdom was accessible only by 
a select few. 
 Here, we see yet another contrast alluded to between the “early” modern world 
and its predecessors. “Mr. Locke” draws such a contrast between those philosophers of 
the ancient world and those of the present: 
 the Sages of those times made a wondrous mystery of their wisdom: a sure sign, 
perhaps,  
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that they were not overstocked with it. It was confined to certain schools and 
fraternities; or it was locked up still more closely in the breasts of particular 
persons. Knowledge was not then diffused in books and general conversation, as 
amongst us; and the way to become wise was to frequent the academies or 
houses of those privileged men, who, by a thousand ambitious arts, had drawn to 
themselves the applause of veneration of the rest of the world.164 
There is a certain nostalgia for the past in what “Mr. Locke” observes. While the 
ancients confined wisdom to a select few, the moderns “diffused” it to everyone; While 
wisdom was something that the ancients sought out from a few sages, wisdom was 
something the modern philosophers sent out to everyone. Furthermore, “Mr. Locke” 
calls the mysteriousness with which the ancients obscured their wisdom as a mark of 
their humility. Not only that, but the ancients who traveled were already philosophers, as 
“Mr. Locke” points out: “They were Sages, that travelled: And we are now inquiring, 
whether this be the way for young men to become Sages.”165 Evidently, “Lord 
Shaftesbury” has forgotten the very question they were trying to answer. 
 Nevertheless, “Lord Shaftesbury” insists that their contemporary, i.e. “early” 
modern, philosophers have also traveled. “Mr. Locke,” however, notes that their world is 
really not different from that of the ancients, for “I know what is to be said for the 
voyagers in Elizabeth’s time. We were just then emerging from ignorance and 
barbarity,” and “The state of Europe at that time was not unlike what I observed of the 
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old world, when knowledge was in a few hands, and the exclusive property, as it were, 
of particular persons.”166 In other words, traveling was effective for the “early” modern 
because England sent her philosophers abroad, and those philosophers knew what to 
look for to the aid the improvement of the country. 
 With time, however, “Mr. Locke” relates that “our curious and courtly youth,” 
and not the just the philosophers, were sent abroad and “it is no secret that the civility, 
we thus acquired, was dearly paid for; and that Irreligion and even Atheism, were, by 
mistake, packed up with their other curiosities.”167 Thus far, Molesworth would seem to 
agree with “Mr. Locke,” based on his observations in his Account of Denmark: sending 
the uneducated youth abroad is dangerous and harmful to England, while sending the 
educated abroad is beneficial for the county. It is, however, important to note that 
Molesworth was neither a sage nor a philosopher, and his travels eventually 
compromised England’s foreign relations with Denmark.  
 With this in mind, “Lord Shaftesbury’s” retort to “Mr. Locke” can also be read as 
Molesworth’s rejoinder: “And so, because Travelling may, by accident, be attended with 
some ill effects, you roundly determine against the thing itself; as if the national 
improvement in arts and civility, which unquestionably arose from it, were to go for 
nothing!”168 It is at this point that their conversation becomes overtly political. “Lord 
Shaftesbury” claims that limiting the foreign travels of youth is like a mother confining 
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her children to the home, weakening their immunity and causing sickliness: “to leave it 
in that sordid state, for fear of those abuses, is methinks but acting with the weak 
apprehension of fond mothers; who deny their children the liberty of stirring from the 
fire-side, for fear of the dirt or damp, air, which, in their field-exercises, may chance to 
incommode them.”169 In response, “Mr. Locke” claims that the health of the mind is not 
the same as the health of the body, and it is the health of the mind that is in question: 
“The allusion would be apt, if the health of the mind, as of the body, depended on the 
use of such Liberty.”170 Subsequently, in response to “Mr. Locke’s” criticism, “Lord 
Shaftesbury” turns the dialogue to a discussion of virtue and vice, and moral character. 
 “Lord Shaftsbury” insists that “Mr. Locke’s” confinement of people to England 
will “shut up mankind in absolute and incurable barbarism.”171 Pointing out that his 
country, England, is not so innocent, “Lord Shaftesbury” chides that with respect to vice, 
“it will be hard to keep clear of it in any part of the world, that I am acquainted with: 
Unless perhaps you take this happy Island of our’s to be as free from Vice, as a 
Neighbouring one, they say, is from Venom.”172 In response to this claim that England is 
not herself free from vice, “Mr. Locke” suggests that there are different degrees of vice 
that may be further exacerbated, “by rambling into countries where it may chance to rage 
with greater virulence, or where such modes of it, at least, prevail as are luckily 
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unknown to us.”173 “Lord Shaftesbury’s” argument is that England will benefit from 
foreign travel, regardless of who undertakes that travel. 
 To this point, “Lord Shaftesbury” suggests that while all European youth on the 
continent may benefit from travel, the youth in England would benefit more, given their 
isolation on an island. “Mr. Locke,” he claims would be exacerbating this particular 
disadvantage by denying them the same experience as their peers: 
The youth of the most accomplished people in Europe would have much to 
correct in themselves, and something, perhaps, to learn, in their voyages into the 
neighbouring nations; however inferiour to their own, in the general state of 
knowledge and politeness. What then, must be the case of our English youth, 
confined in this remote corner among themselves, and indulged in their own 
rustic and licentious habits?174 
According to “Lord Shaftesbury,” not only are English youth disadvantaged by living on 
an island, but they are also stereotyped and “stigmatized” as being less civilized than 
those on the continent. “Mr. Locke,” in insisting that foreign travel not be undertaken by 
the youth, would be denying them a formative aspect of their education: 
 Our northern climate has never been famous for the civility of it’s inhabitants; 
who have  
rather been stigmatized in all ages, and are still considered by the rest of Europe, 
as proud, churlish, and unsocial. The very circumstance of our being Islanders 
                                                 
173 Ibid., 23. 
174 Ibid., 35. 
 74 
 
seems to expose us to the just approach of inhospitality. And if, we this 
disadvantage of our situation, we cherish, and not correct, those manners which 
are so apt to spring from it, let us not take it amiss that foreigners distinguish us 
by such names, as we well deserve, tho’ our pride may suffer from the 
application of them.175  
In other words, “Lord Shaftesbury” contends that until action is taken to remedy the 
problem of correcting English mannerisms and (truthful) stigmatizations, those names 
given to the inhabitants of England will remain justified. In “Lord Shaftesbury’s” view, 
it is the role of foreign travel to correct these deficiencies. 
 Given “Lord Shaftesbury’s” insistence on the importance of foreign travel for 
correcting the behavior of English youth, their conversation turns to what such behavior 
should look like. “Mr. Locke” points out thus far, “Lord Shaftesbury” has only pointed 
out the defects of the English youth, without yet describing what kind of character they 
should develop through travel: 
 To speak my mind frankly, my Lord, your defence of foreign travel, as lively and  
plausible as it seemed, has no solid basis to rest upon. You tell us of many 
defects in the breeding of our English youth, and you would willingly redress 
them: But in what way this is best done, can never be known from vague and 
general declamation.176  
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Having failed to convince “Lord Shaftesbury” of the dangers of foreign travel, “Mr. 
Locke” now adopts another approach, which is to solicit from him what his ideal English 
gentlemen would look like. “Mr. Locke” demands: 
 To make this inquiry to purpose, some certain principles must be laid down; 
some  
scheme of life and manners must be formed; some idea of model of the character, 
you would imprint on young minds, must be described; to which we may 
constantly refer, as we go along; and by which, as a Rule, we may estimate the 
fitness and propriety of that sort of breeding, you would recommend to us.177 
“Lord Shaftesbury,” according to “Mr. Locke,” has failed to describe the results he 
expects in the youth as a result of foreign travel. This, “Mr. Locke” thinks, has impeded 
their conversation, because it is based on vague principles and not actuality.  
For example, “Mr. Locke” points out that “Lord Shaftesbury” has been 
inadvertently advocating not the formation of citizens of England, but citizens of the 
world, rebuking him that: “Your Lordship, it may be, in your sublime view of things, is 
projecting to make of your Pupil, what is called in the widest sense of the terms, a 
Citizen of the World.”178 By advocating world travel and the adoption of customs they 
observe abroad, or at least a correction of their own, “Lord Shaftesbury” has perhaps 
been causing them to also abandon those things that make them distinctively English. 
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“Mr. Locke” therefore asks “Lord Shaftesbury” to hone in on the formation one should 
expect from foreign travel in the creation of specifically English citizens:  
First, if you please, let us provide that he be a worthy citizen of England; and, by 
your favour, let me ennoble this small Island of our’s, with the pompous 
appellation of the world. It is that world, at least, which our adventurer is to play 
his part; and for the commerce of which it concerns him most immediately to be 
prepared.179 
“Mr. Locke” then lists the characteristics of an English gentleman, directing “Lord 
Shaftesbury’s” attention to the English nobility, because that social class would be most 
influential in national policy.  
“Mr. Locke” suggests that such nobility should strive to become English 
“senators” as the highest expression of service to the nation:  
An English citizen or, if you will, Senator (for this is the station to which our 
greater citizens do, and our best should aspire) can never acquit himself of the 
duties he owed his country, under this character, but by furnishing himself with 
all those qualities of the head and heart, which his superior rank and pretentions 
demand.180 
Youth aspiring to this social role, in “Mr. Locke’s” view, should “be early and 
thoroughly seasoned with the principles of virtue and religion,” “be trained, by be in a 
strict discipline, to the command of his temper and passions,” and “be inured to habits of 
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self-government, or rather directed, to it’s right object, the public good.”181 In other 
words, English youth should be educated to value religion, self-control, and the public 
good. All of these values, however, are only possible if the youth value their own 
country, England, which runs counter to “Lord Shaftesbury’s” recommendation of 
foreign travel, which “Mr. Locke” pointed out creates world citizens. It must be 
emphasized, according to “Mr. Locke,” that the English citizen, “Above all, That he 
have a reverence for the legal constitution of his country, and a fervent affection for the 
great community, to which he belongs.”182 Given his zeal for England, “Lord 
Shaftesbury” readily agrees with these points; however, “Mr. Locke” points out that 
these are not compatible with his recommendation for travel. 
 More alarming to “Mr. Locke” is “Lord Shaftesbury’s” portrayal of England as 
backward compared to the rest of Europe. “Mr. Locke” chides him: “your Lordship was 
pleased to tell us a very melancholy story. England, it seems, is over-run with barbarism 
and ignorance; it’s inhabitants are rude and uncivilized; and nothing can be learnt among 
them, which is fit to appears in good company.”183 “Lord Shaftesbury’s” desire to 
develop English gentlemen abroad inadvertently assumes that England is degenerate 
compared to the rest of Europe. Rather than accept this vision of England, “Mr. Locke” 
instead accuses “Lord Shaftesbury” of backwardness, in that his “Lordship had forgotten 
to speak of England, as it now subsists, in the close of the seventeenth century.”184 “Mr. 
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Locke” points out that the English have done much to be already considered “men,” 
contrary to the claims of “Lord Shaftesbury,” telling him: “It seemed to me as if the 
English might now, at least, deserve to be consider’d as Men; and that in our courts and 
camps, if not in our colleges, we might stand a chance of finding what your Lordship 
would not disdain to qualify with the name of Gentlemen.”185  The two interlocutors will 
retain these same positions with respect to the English nation and the people it produces, 
even at the end of the dialogue. 
 Failing to change his mind at the insistence of “Mr. Locke,” “Lord Shafterbury,” 
is forced to respond to a prophecy of “Mr. Locke” at the end of the dialogues. Here, “Mr. 
Locke” prophesizes that “the happy period is not, perhaps, far off.”186 This period, of 
course, is not only Hurd’s own, but also includes the generation after Locke’s death. 
First, “Mr. Locke” prophesizes that “the Universities of England will be as respectable, 
for the learning they teach, the principles they instil, and the moral they inculcate.”187 
This first prophecy is a rebuke to “Lord Shaftesbury’s” assumption that England is 
inadequate for the education of youth. Next, “Mr. Locke” prophesizes that “scholastic 
theology shall give place to a rational Divinity, conducted on the principles and well-
interpreted Scripture: When their Sums and Systems shall fly before enlightened Reason 
and sober Speculation.”188 This second prophecy is an account of the deist sentiments 
that Locke and his contemporaries were seen to have, which, as we have seen, was 
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memorialized by Queen Caroline in her grotto. Then, “Mr. Locke” prophesizes that “my 
prophetic eye penetrates farther. Amidst these improvements in real science, the 
languages shall be learnt for use, and not pedantry.”189 He specifies that this includes not 
only the proper use of words in natural philosophy, but also “respect” for the ancients 
and “emulation” for their writing styles. Lastly, “Mr. Locke” foresees “a freer 
commerce” between England and the world,190 and in a facetious swipe at “Lord 
Shaftesbury,” adds: 
I cannot be mistaken in one Predication, ‘That the mode of early Travel will still 
continue; perhaps it’s fury will increase; and our youth of quality be still sent 
abroad for their education, when every reason shall cease which your Lordship 
has now alleged in favour of that practice.191  
In other words, “Mr. Locke” envisions the practice of traveling as continuing to thrive in 
England, in addition to his other prophecies.  
 “Lord Shaftesbury” remains skeptical and finds these prophecies unconvincing, 
retorting that while “This last prediction may, perhaps, be true,” nevertheless, “I have no 
great faith in modern Prophecy, and see at present no symptoms of this coming age of 
Gold.”192 It is here that their dialogue ends. In a closing remark to Molesworth, “Lord 
Shaftesbury” remarks that his record of their conversation left out the contributions of a 
few others who were with them, commenting that their inclusion “would, no doubt, have 
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given something more of life to the sketch, I here send you; as their presence, you may 
believe, certainly did to the original conversation.”193 In a closing remark to Molesworth, 
“Lord Shaftesbury” recalls that “it gave me a pleasure to hear the old man indulging 
himself in the prospect of better days, which, as young as we are, and as warmly as we 
wish to see them, you and I had always despaired of.”194 This confirms the relationship 
between Molesworth and “Lord Shaftesbury” suggested at the beginning of the text, 
namely: that we are to read them as both expressing similar, if not the same, sentiments 
concerning travel, education, and England and in need of correction by “Mr. Locke.” 
While they are pessimistic about England’s future, “Mr. Locke” remains optimistic. The 
reader is left with an impression of Locke that is not only truly as ‘England’s 
philosopher,’ but also as ‘England’s prophet.’ This sentiment is one that will be 
challenged a generation later when England faces the realities of world affairs. 
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CHAPTER VI 
LOCKE AS EXEMPLAR, 1794 
 
In 1794, the author of a text called Literary and Critical Remarks, commented on Hurd’s 
Dialogues on travel, observing that “The early impressions are the most efficacious, is a 
good observation in favour of early travel; yet with this regard; whether it be more 
desirable that they should be imbibed at home or abroad? But all nations and all things 
seem now hastening to an universal sameness of nothingness.”195 The critic’s position 
regarding the sentiments of “Mr. Locke” and “Lord Shaftesbury” is one of indifference. 
A generation earlier, Hurd had portrayed “Mr. Locke” and “Lord Shaftesbury” as 
agreeing that English youth needed to be educated, but differing as to whether that 
education was best achieved domestically or through foreign travel. The critic suggests 
that this debate is now, in 1794, irrelevant because of the “sameness” now erasing 
previous distinctions in the world—a blasé that had most likely befallen Europe due, in 
part, to continuance of foreign travel anticipated by Hurd through the voice of “Mr. 
Locke.” 
As if answering the predications of Hurd voiced through “Mr. Locke,” Robert 
Alves published Sketches of a History of Literature, in which he commented on the 
literary sentiments of past eras, as well as the present. In Section VIII, “On the Four 
Æras of the English Language; and their Characters,” Alves writes that his own present 
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era is the finest in the history of English: “The fourth and last aera of the English 
Language is the present,” and this period is unprecedented in that “In no age whatever, 
has such a profusion of light been thrown upon the human mind, or its different powers, 
whether of intellect, taste or genius.” 196According to Alves, these great writers, with 
Richard Hurd included among them, were all “encouragers of polite learning, liberal 
sentiment; and revivers of the literature, and of the genuine and elegant simplicity of the 
uncorrupted ancients.”197 Hurd, of course, will not die until 1808; however, it appears 
that he correctly anticipated a revival of the ancients, which evidently endured even a 
generation later.   
In this same section, with the benefit of hindsight, Alves also commented on the 
period that the actual Locke wrote, identifying it as the one directly preceding his own. 
He regards this period as the “golden era” of the English language:  
The third aera may be supposed to commence with Dryden and end with Pope, as 
its most finished and accomplished poets; and to begin with Locke and 
Shaftsbury, and end with Addison and Swift, as most distinguished for 
philosophy and morality. This is commonly reckoned the golden aera of our 
tongue;—the two last mentioned writers, particularly in prose, seem to have 
carried it to the highest pitch.—Neatness, correctness, and elegance, chiefly 
borrowed from the ancients, seems to be the proper characteristics of this age.198 
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So, while it was the period of Locke that “borrowed” from the ancients, it was Alves’ 
own period that emulated them. Propriety was also a concern for not only the writing 
style of the period, but also of the content of that writing. 
 Despite his mention of Locke as among the “most distinguished for philosophy 
and morality,” Alves also excoriates Locke as precipitating the present state of 
skepticism and confusion in which philosophy now finds itself. In Essay IX, “On Plapit, 
Bars, and Senate Orators,” Alves writes: 
An airy, though ingenious fabric had been raised, to which Mr. Locke had 
unwittingly afforded the first materials; Bishop Berkeley afterwards carried on 
the work with much art and address; and Mr. Hume, with equal ingenuity, reared 
it higher still, and at last brought it to its highest pitch. All at once this wonderful 
pile met with confusion, as it were from above; the winds and the tempests blew, 
and shook it to the foundations. However, Babel-like, built with labour, vanity, 
and blind ambition; as it had no stable or secure base, like a building on the sand, 
it yielded to the first blast; it tottered and fell.199  
Berkeley and Hume took the philosophy of Locke to its radical conclusion, which was 
characterized by uncertainty about anything. Alves suggests this to be a direct result of 
the folly of philosophy: its quest for truth was “built with labour, vanity, and blind 
ambition,” yet with Hume that project was dealt a lethal blow.200 While in Alves’ eyes, 
vanity may have caused the collapse of philosophy’s project, vanity and other vices were 
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also the topic of choice for the anecdotal literature of the period—which often employed 
the personages of Locke and his contemporizes of models for correct behavior.  
 For example, the Rev. John Adams in his Elegant anecdotes, and bon-mots, of 
the greatest princes, politicians, philosophers, orators, and wits of modern times, 
advertises on his title page that his work is “calculated to inspire the minds of youth with 
noble, virtuous, generous, and liberal sentiments.”201 That project, however, is also 
within the context of things devolving into the “sameness” observed by the critic in 
Literary and Critical Remarks, as his anecdotes were lifted from the early biographies of 
Le Clerc and Coste. They are worth repeating, however, because Adams changes some 
wording of each, reflecting both his purpose and the times.   
Drawing from Le Clerc, Adams relates the card game Locke played with several 
members of the nobility gathered at Lord Shaftesbury’s residence, replacing it for his 
own purposes. According to Adams’ version of the anecdote: 
Mr. Locke having been introduced by Lord Shaftesbury to the Duke of 
Buckingham and Lord Halifax, these three noblemen, instead of conversing with 
the philosopher, as might naturally have been expected, on literary subjects, in a 
very short time sat down to cards.202 
Adams manages to set up the anecdote so as to suggest that Shaftesbury’s guests were 
expected to converse with Locke on “literary subjects,” which they did not, choosing 
                                                 
201 John Adams, Elegant anecdotes, and bon-mots, or the greatest princes, politicians, philosophers, 
orators, and wits of modern times (1794), title page. 
202 Ibid. 361 
 85 
 
instead to play cards. Le Clerc’s version lacks this detail, which has the effect of 
augmenting Locke’s importance and social status relative to the guests, perhaps to 
heighten attention to the moral failings of the latter. Adams continues:  
Mr. Locke, after looking on some time, pulled out his pocket-book, and began to 
write with great attention. One of the company observing this, took the liberty of 
asking him what he was writing. “My Lord,” says Locke, “I am endeavouring as 
far as possible, to profit by my perfect situation; for having waited with 
impatience for the honour of being in company with the greatest geniuses of the 
age, I thought I could do nothing better than to write down your conversation; 
and indeed, I have set down the substance of what you have said for this hour or 
two.”203  
Again, here Adams tweaks Le Clerc’s version. Of particular significance is his account 
of what Locke wrote. In Le Clerc’s version, Locke writes that he had “the Honour of 
being present at a Meeting of the wisest and most ingenious men of the Age, and 
enjoying at length this Happiness.”204 In Adam’s version, Locke refers to his fellow 
card-players as “the greatest geniuses of the age” and omits that he was “enjoying at 
length this Happiness.” Adams’ Locke, therefore, regards his colleagues as neither wise 
nor a source of happiness. Adams concludes:   
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This well-timed ridicule had its desired affect: and these noblemen, fully sensible 
of its force, immediately quitted their play, and entered into a conversation more 
rational, and better suited to the dignity of their characters.205 
According to Le Clerc, “There was no need for Mr. Locke to read much of this Dialogue, 
these noble Lords perceiv’d the banter, and diverted themselves a while with improving 
the jest; they left their play and enter’d into Conversation more agreeable to their 
Character and so spent the rest of the day.”206 In Adam’s tale, Locke consciously 
“desires” to divert them from playing cards, the lords are “fully sensible” of this desire, 
and so “immediately” stop playing. There is no “banter” or “improvised” comedy; 
Instead, there is only “rational” and “dignified” conversation. The effect of all these 
tweaks and omissions is to give the impression of a Locke that is very much a moralist 
who both exudes dignity and refinement and expects the same from others. Quite clearly, 
this is the kind of character one would wish to portray in a work aimed at the edification 
of youth.  
 Adams also includes an anecdote lifted from Coste, which tells of Locke 
conversing with artisans. Adams writes that 
Mr. Locke was fond of conversing with mechanics in their own way, and used to 
say, that the knowledge of arts contained more true philosophy than learned 
hypotheses. By putting questions to artificers, he would sometimes discover a 
secret in their art, which they did not well understand themselves, and by these 
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means gave them views entirely new, which they put in practice much to their 
advantage.207  
This anecdote that Adams records is actually a derived from Coste’s reflection at the end 
of his own. In his narrative prior to this reflection, however, Coste told of how Locke 
would converse with a gardener, a jeweler, and a chemist (among others) about their 
respective occupations, remarking that “the knowledge of the Arts contained more true 
Philosophy, than all those fine learned Hypotheses,” as does Adams.208 Adams leaves 
out Coste’s remark that these “fine learned Hypotheses” lacked true philosophy because 
they, “having no relation to the nature of things, are fit for nothing at bottom, but to 
make men lose their time in inventing, or comprehending them.”209 Adams glosses over 
this, instead remarking simply that “the knowledge of the arts contained more true 
philosophy than learned hypotheses,” without giving Locke’s justification. This 
omission is significant in light of what other commentators were suggesting about 
Locke, namely: that his philosophy precipitated philosophy’s devolution into skepticism. 
In other words, what was valued was Locke’s usefulness as a moral exemplar, not his 
philosophical contributions. This explains why, for Adams, the significant part of the 
anecdote is Coste’s reflection on Locke, which he repeats almost verbatim. This part of 
Coste’s account is understandable independently of his philosophy, and instills in youth 
the importance of humility and service to others.  
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 It is interesting to note that Adams reinforces this message by eliding it with 
another anecdote told by Coste: that of Locke’s favorite maxim: 
He was so far from affecting any airs of studied gravity, that he would sometimes 
divert himself with imitating it, in order to ridicule it with better success; and 
upon these occasions he always remembered this maxim of the Duke de 
Rochefaucault, which he admired above all others, “that gravity is a mystery of 
the body, employed to conceal the defects of the mind.”210 
Locke’s double entendre here remains the same: “gravity” can still be taken either to 
mean a demeanor of the mind, or a power of matter. The joke, recall, is that an 
explicable power of matter had to be invented to hide the ignorance of intellectuals, 
thereby preserving their stature. Because of Adams’ preference to deemphasize Locke’s 
philosophical ideas, we can assume that he included this maxim after a discussion of 
Locke’s conversations with artisans, only to urge the youth to dispel arrogance.  
Lastly, Adams includes an anecdote found neither in Le Clerc nor Coste, relating 
to one of Locke’s contemporaries, Anthony Collins: 
 In the latter end of his life, Mr. Locke contracted a friendship with Anthony 
Collins, Esq.  
to whom he had left a letter to be delivered after his death, which concludes with 
the following remarkable words: “May you live long and happy in the enjoyment 
of health, freedom, content, and all those blessings which Providence has 
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bestowed on you, and your virtue entitled you to. You loved me living, and will 
preserve my memory now I am dead. All the use to be made of it is, that this life 
is a scene of vanity, which soon passes away, and affords no solid satisfaction, 
but in the consciousness of doing well. This is what I can say upon experience, 
what you will find to be true, when you come to make up the account. Adieu.”211 
In this remarkable anecdote, we see a Locke concerned about what his legacy will be 
after his death. Entailed in this, is a disregard for vanity, as we saw in the other 
anecdotes included by Adams. Together, Adams’ anecdotes portray Locke as an 
exemplar of moral virtue, as someone who should be emulated for his humility, distain 
for vanity and arrogance, and mindfulness about how he will be remembered after he 
dies. These same values were also associated with Locke by other writers within this 
same genre.  
For example, in his “Essay on Pride” in Interesting anecdotes, Joseph Addison 
also comments on the “uncommon diffidence and humility” shared by Locke, Newton, 
and Boyle—even going so far as to compare their virtue to that of Christ: 
Newton, Locke, and Boyle, who were, perhaps, the sublimest geniuses the world 
ever saw, were remarkable for an uncommon diffidence and humility. The great 
Mr. Addison also, it is well known, was remarkable for humility, and an 
excessive bashfulness. And if such men as these, who raised the human nature to 
the highest dignity and perfection to which it was ever raised by any, except the 
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Messiah, were not proud; what can people in general, who pass through life 
unnoticed, except by a few of their relations and neighbours, and without doing 
or writing any thing worthy of being handed down to posterity; who are 
frequently not useless, but pernicious members of society to be proud of.212 
Here too, Addison utilizes the personages of Locke and his contemporaries to instruct 
others in modesty. His claim is that if the intellectual greats of England passed through 
life with little concern for public acclaim (yet are still valued by society), so too can a 
common person lead a life of humility and still remain valued by society. 
 Curiously, Locke, Newton, and Boyle were three of the five men represented in 
Queen Caroline’s grotto, noted at that time for their deism and religious heterodoxy. 
Even in 1794, these men were still closely associated with each other, and the debate 
concerning their religiosity remained the same, but at a more superficial level. In yet 
another work of anecdotal literature, The Beauties of History, L. M. Stretch purports to 
write “pictures of virtue and vice, drawn from real life,” organized by the moral value in 
question. In the “Religion” section, Stretch explains that his task is “to consider what has 
been the faith and practice of the greatest men in our own nation with respect to the 
revealed religion.”213 His mention of the “revealed religion” is significant, as it contrasts 
with the “natural religion” with which Locke, Boyle, Newton, and Wollaston were 
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associated two generations earlier. In addition to remarking on the piety of Boyle and 
Newton,214 also cites Locke as a model Christian: 
Mr. Locke, whose accurate talent in reasoning is so much celebrated even by the 
sceptics and infidels of our times, showed his zeal for the Christian religion, first 
in his middle age, by publishing a discourse on purpose to demonstrate the 
reasonableness of believing Jesus to be the promised Messiah; and after that, in 
the last years of his life, by a very judicious commentary upon several of the 
epistles of St. Paul.215 
Here, Stretch references Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity and his commentaries 
on St. Paul’s letters as evidence for his religious piety. Three generations ago, such texts 
were condemned by William Carroll for concealing Locke’s true predilections to deism. 
Taking these texts at face value, Stretch’s assessment is in many respects superficial 
relative to the analysis done by generations closer to the historical Locke. 
 Seeming to concur with Stretch, James Hare published An essay on the necessity 
of revealed religion in which he responded to the claim that Christianity could not lay 
claim to universal truth, because its believers were confined to only some parts of the 
world, writing:  
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It is objected against the Christian Religion, that its truths are only known in a 
small part of the globe. The arts and sciences are equally confined to that small 
part of the globe; but no one, I believe, objects to their truth on that account.216  
Hare responds that it is enough that the greatest intellectuals of England, including 
Locke, had read the Christian scriptures and given their approval of them, because they 
alone could attest to their truth: 
It is sufficient that the Scriptures have been read, and studied, and their truth 
rigidly examined, by the most enlightened men in the most enlightened part of 
the world; not only by the clergy, but by Grotius, Pascal, Locke, Newton, 
Addison, Milton, Boyle, Bacon, and Selden, all laymen; each of them 
distinguished for learning and genius, and in acuteness of intellect not yet 
surpassed by any men that have been born; and that these have respectively by 
their writings borne testimony to their truth.217  
What made Locke and this group of intellectuals so esteemed and adept at verifying the 
truth of texts, Hare claims, is their character, encompassing both their intellect and 
conviction that Christianity is the true religion. It is from these two aspects of their 
character, Hare contends, that their authority of judgment derived:  
Considering the characters of these men, their superior degree of natural intellect, 
and the high improvement of that intellect, their firm and unshaken belief in the 
religion of Christ, after their strict and sever examination of it, is such a proof of 
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its truth, that if all the inhabitants of Asia, Africa, and South America were to 
disbelieve it, still it would remain undiminished; for in the investigation and 
determination of truth, the authority of such competent judges is of infinitely 
greater weight and consequence, than that of all the collective unlettered men in 
those religions.218 
The assessments of Locke and his contemporaries, provided by both Stretch and Hare 
alike, give the impression of a superficial reading of the characters of those men. In 
particular, their analyses are based on a mere mention of their works, rather than a close 
reading of them—as had been in vogue immediately after Locke’s death. 
Likewise, those reaching the opposite conclusion, that Locke and Newton were 
really atheists, also made use of this same superficial assessment. For example, the 
author of Literary and critical remarks, who had also criticized the work of Hurd, as we 
have seen, accused Locke of being a materialist: 
In regard to Locke, most persons seem ignorant, that, exclusive of his 
contradictions, he was a materialist; and most divines seem to forget, that both he 
and the Sir Isaac Newton were heterodox. Locke’s Reasonableness of 
Christianity is a work rarely mentioned by those who seem determined to have 
all staple writers and perferments on their side.219  
The critic suggests that Locke is actually a materialist, and that those who think 
otherwise are “ignorant.” In response to those who, like Stretch and Hare, claim that 
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Locke and Newton are exemplars of piety, the critic suggests that they overlook the 
heterodoxy of their texts, choosing to see only what they want. Of course, by suggesting 
that Locke is a materialist, the critic engages in the same activity for which he condemns 
other writers, as his assessment is also based on a superficial understanding of the actual 
Locke. The critic continues this condemnation of Locke by accusing him of not only 
materialism, but of laying the groundwork for the skepticism of Hume, warning: 
 Let the reader consult Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural religion; the best of 
his  
philosophical works, which by the substitution of sense for inanity, and, as it 
seems, earnest for jest; are, in comparison with his professed sceptic writings, 
what Locke’s Reasonableness of Christianity is to his sceptic writings, for such I 
esteem his Essay on Human Understanding; the most dangerous, though I will 
not say intentional ill engine ever put into the hands of ill disposed men.220 
The critic likens Hume’s work on natural religion to Locke’s Reasonableness of 
Christianity, suggesting these two works, unlike their other philosophical works, express 
“sense” and “earnestness.” For the critic, of course, this means an endorsement of 
Christianity 
 It was not only Locke’s religiosity that was debated, however: commentators also 
debated the strength of his political commitments. The Biographical Magazine, for 
instance, calls “John Locke, one of our greatest philosophers”221 and continues that 
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“Locke, as a metaphysician, analyzed the human mind, and traced its operations with a 
marvelous sagacity; and, as a politician, he enforced the principle of toleration, and the 
love of liberty.”222 Evidently, the Biographical Magazine thought very highly of Locke 
for both his philosophy and politics. As with his religion, the legacy of his political 
thinking was also contested, and one of its most important critics was John Adams, who 
would become the second president of the United States. 
In A defence of the constitutions of government of the United States of America 
Adams repeatedly mentions that otherwise brilliant philosophers commonly endorse 
impractical political theories. Among the examples he gives are Plato and More, who, 
despite their desire to create a perfect society, nevertheless endorsed theories that—if 
practiced—would precipitate mayhem: 
Chimerical systems of legislation are neither new nor uncommon, even among 
men of the most resplendent genius and extensive learning. It would not be too 
bold to say, that some parts of Plato and Sir Thomas More as wild as the ravings 
of Bedlam. A philosopher may be perfect master of Descartes and Leibnitz, may 
pursue his own inquiries into metaphysics to any length you please, may enter 
into the inmost recesses of the human mind, and make the noblest discoveries for 
the benefit of his species; nay, he may defend the principles of liberty and the 
rights of mankind with great abilities and success; and, after all, when called 
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upon to produce a plan of legislation, he may astonish the world with a figural 
absurdity.223  
According to Adams, such philosophers should be encouraged to investigate impractical 
areas of philosophy, such as epistemology or metaphysics, but should not be asked to 
produce any practical plan for government. Such philosophers can even defend political 
ideals and rights, but cannot be expected or encouraged to create systems that put those 
into practice. 
 With respect to Locke, Adams singled out his Constitutions of Carolina as an 
example of how impractical the political plans of a philosopher can be. Specifically, 
Adams points out that Locke’s plan to establish a nobility was impractical in so small a 
colony as Carolina, because such an arrangement would reduce the population of any 
other social classes:  
 Mr Locke, in 1663, was employed to trace out a plan of legislation for Carolina; 
and he gave the  
whole authority, executive and legislative, to the eight proprietors, the lords 
Berkeley, Clarendon, Albemarie, Craven, and Ashley; and Messiurs Carteret, 
Berkeley, and Colleton, and their heirs. This new oligarchical sovereignty created 
at once three orders of nobility: barons, with twelve thousand, &c.; and 
landgraves, with eighty thousand. Who did this legislator think would live under 
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his government? He should have first created a few species of beings to govern, 
before he instituted such a government.224 
Locke, he thinks, should have first considered the governed, and only after consider 
those who would govern. According to Adams, Locke lacked the foresight to see the 
practical consequences of his political arrangement, regardless of how brilliant he may 
have been in other areas of thinking. 
 Furthermore, like Carroll and others from past generations who accused Locke of 
surreptitiously reasoning people out of Christianity, Adams accuses Locke of swindling 
people out of liberty. The citizens of the newly-formed United States, however, are in 
Adams’ eyes not so easily duped as their predecessors: 
Americans in this age are too enlightened to be bubbled out of their liberties, 
even by such mighty names as Locke, Milton, Turgot, or Hume; they know that 
popular elections of one essential branch of the legislature, frequently repeated, 
are the only possible method of forming a free constitution, or of preserving the 
government of laws from the domination of men, or of preserving their lives, 
liberties, or properties in security; they know, though Locke and Milton did not, 
that when popular elections are given up, liberty and free government must be 
given up.225 
Adams asserts that popular elections are the only safeguard to protect liberties. He 
claims that not only did otherwise brilliant figures like Locke and Milton fail to realize 
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this, but that the citizens of his country are actually smarter than those figures were, 
because they do.  
John Adams also said he was “friend to religion,” along with Newton. In other words, 
the new American people, believing in popular rule, would no longer accept ideas 
simply on account of the person who thought of them. 
 Adams’ account of Locke, like the others we discussed from 1794, indeed 
captures the sentiment of this generation, expressed by the critical in Literary and 
Critical Remarks, that “all nations and all things seem now hastening to an universal 
sameness of nothingness.”226 This “hastening” is towards a “universal sameness” now, 
because according to Adams, everyone is a legitimate critic of important figures of the 
past. This “sameness” is also “nothingness,” because those criticisms are only 
superficial, insofar as they either repeat those of the past, or do so at an elementary level. 
In the case of Locke, the same criticisms of his character were repeated from the past, 
but were in many respects done superficially.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
226 Literary and Critical Remarks, 266. 
 99 
 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Having shown how distinctive each representation of Locke’s character became at 
intervals of every thirty years, much is to be gained from such insight. For one thing, it 
reveals the importance of dispelling common myths of Locke that commonly impede 
scholarship. For example, commentators have interpreted Locke’s reference to himself 
as an “under-laborer” to mean that he saw himself as only clearing up bad philosophy to 
make room for the greats, as one would perhaps clean up rubbish. Locke’s context, 
though, reveals an alternative explanation, namely: that he assumed the role of a secular 
clergy who acted as an intermediary between the greats and their philosophies and the 
common people and their ways of thinking. This is a very different task from what has 
been assumed and changes the way one approaches texts such as the Essay. 
 Taking seriously William Carroll’s criticism of Locke as a Spinozist and 
substance monist is also useful, as it opens up new ways thinking about Locke’s 
metaphysics and epistemology, and possibly even his political philosophy. For example, 
commentators have been perplexed by what is now known as Locke’s doctrine of 
superaddition. The issue of superaddition is really one of origin: it is about how matter 
comes to think. Arguably, commentators on this issue have treated Locke as a Cartesian, 
or as at least having Cartesian sympathies. This has led to thinking matter becoming as 
inexplicable as the mind-body issue. If we take Carroll’s criticism seriously, we will 
think about this issue in a new way that avoids the problems of Cartesianism. 
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 The reception of Queen Caroline’s grotto indicated in the essay contest 
submissions invites us to consider Locke within the context of deism. Because Newton, 
Boyle, Wollaston, Clarke, and Locke were perceived as advocates for the natural 
religion, it is worth thinking about Locke’s place among them (and other known deists at 
the time) as not only a philosopher, but also someone with medical training. This would 
help identify his unique contributions to the deist cause, from a philosophical and 
medical perspective. 
 Lastly, we have the portrayals of Locke as a fictitious character talking to a 
fictitious Shaftesbury, the recycling of anecdotes of Locke in the late eighteenth-century, 
and his superficial appearance within the revolutionary literature of the America context. 
These cases remind us that not all later criticism of Locke is informed, or even an 
accurate reflection of the man to whom they are directed. This should make us aware of 
our own place as scholars so as to not confuse any portrayal of the character of Locke 
with the actual man that character is held to represent.     
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